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Corporate Liquidations And The
Income Tax
BORIS 1. BITTKER AND NORMAN REDLICH
"IN addition to the tax loopholes I have described, there are a number of
others which also represent inequities, and should be closed. Most of
these permit individuals, by one device or another, to take unfair advan-
tage of the difference between the ta.x rates on ordinary income and the
lower tax rates on capital gains. As one example, under present law
producers of motion pictures, and their star players, have attempted to
avoid taxes by creating temporary corporations which are dissolved after
making one film. By this device, their income from making the film,
which ought to be taxed at the individual income-ta.x rates, would be
taxed only at the capital gains rate. Thus, they might escape as much as
two-thirds of the tax they should pay." 1
President Truman has called the attention of Congress to the "col-
lapsible corporation," one more of the perennially alluring contrivances
for transmuting ordinary income into capital gain. A motion picture pro-
ducer and the leading performers organize a corporation to manufacture
and market a single film. They invest nominal amounts, receiving the cor-
poration's stock in return, and the corporation borrows enough to defray
the costs of production. Since the producer and the key performers
receive modest salari~, if any, the costs of production are appreciably
less than normal. After the picture has been completed, contracts for its
distribution are made by the corporation. Then the corporation is liqui-
dated, the shareholders surrendering their stock in e.xcllange for propor-
tionate interests in the distribution contracts. Since section 115 (c) 0 f
the Internal Revenue Code provides that a complete liquidation shall be
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1 President Truman's ta.-..: message to Congress, N. Y. Herald Tribune, Jan. 24, 1950,
p. 14. The recommendation had not been embodied in a legislative proposal when this
article went to press, though Exhibit 4 to Secretary Snyder's Statement before the House
Committee on Vvays and Means, Feb. 3, 1950, asked for the denial of long-term capital
gain treatment "to any shareholder who sells or liquidates his securities in any corpora-
tion so utilized by him for such ta.-..: avoidance purposes."
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treated like a sale, the shareholders report a capital gain of the difference
between the value of the contracts (which can be estimated from the film's
early reception) and the cost basis of the shares. The gain is long-term
if the shares have been held for more than six months. The value reported
for the shareholder's rights under the contract is then depreciated over
the estimated commercial life of the film. If the net receipts correspond
to the reported value, there will be no further gain or loss. If, however, the
receipts depart from the estimate, the shareholder will realize ordinary
income or loss in the amount of the difference.2 It is immediately patent
that the value of the contracts, received on liquidation, or their proceeds
are intended by all concerned to be remuneration for the shareholders'
previously uncompensated personal services. The Treasury Department
reported to the Congress that in one such case an independent producer
and his wife realized a net gain of $615,000, taxed only at 25% rather
than at the enervatingly higher rate which would have been applicable
if the gain had been received as salary for his services.s
The President took film production as his example in illustrating this
tax "loophole," though it has been exploited in other industries as well.
His choice was politically shrewd; even if the device had not been most
popular in the motion picture industry, few will believe that a heavier tax
on the land of illusion will impair the nation's industrial health. At the
same time, Hollywood may benefit indirectly: its tax avoidance may
titillate the public as much as its marital lapses. There is an understand-
ing of popular psychology in the entertainment industry's adage: 1/1
don't care what you write about me so long as you spell my name right."
But the "collapsible corporation" is suited to any industry characterized
by short-term enterprises, such as real estate, construction, novelties, and
others. The Treasury Department alone knows the extent of its use, but
it is unlikely that only the motion picture industry has succumbed to the
lure of "25% money." 4
2 There is a partial description in the Supplementary Treasury Department Statement
on Miscellaneous Loopholes, presented to the House Committee on Ways and Means
Feb. 6, 1950. (The printed hearings were not available for citation at the time these
notes were prepared.) Certain variations in practice of which the authors have learned
privately are referred to at appropriate points in text and footnotes hereafter. The
method of amortizing motion pictures is described by Tannenbaum, AlIIorlizalio,~ 0/
Motio,~ PiclltreS, PROCEEDINGS OF THE TAX INSTITUTE, UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALI-
FORNIA SCHOOL OF LAW 345 (1949). On the possibility of reporting as capital gain
rather than as ordinary income any subsequent receipts which exceed the value of the
contracts at the time of liquidation, .lee Brodsky and King, Ta."( Savings Through Dis-
frilJ1ttiolls il~ Liquidatioll of Corporate COlltracts, 27 TAXES 806 (1949).
3 Treasury Statement, supra note 2.
4 The Treasury's statement, supra note 2, contains the information that "there are
over a hundred cases being e.;::amined by the Bureau of Internal Revenue," and that
the device "is also being used to some extent in the building- and construction trades."
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Although the "collapsible corporation" is the direct target of President
Truman's attack, it is only the forward outpost of a massive ta.~-avoiding
force. Since 1924, with one brief interlude, a distribution in complete liqui-
dation of any corporation has been treated like the proceeds of a sale of the
stock: the stockholder realizes a capital gain or loss of the difference
between what he paid for his stock and what he gets on liquidation.1l The
corporation's accumulated earnings and profits are not taxed as such.
If, however, they had been distributed in earlier years they would have
been taxed to the shareholder as ordinary income at graduated rates.
The postponement of distribution until liquidation effects an obvious tax
saving. Nor need the corporation be completely liquidated; even a "partial
liquidation" will be taxed under some circumstances as a capital gain
or loss.6 This disparity between ordinary dividends and liquidating dis-
tributions, it must be emphasized, is of general applicability. The liquida-
tion of a "collapsible corporation" differs from other liquidations only
in that it is pursuant to a preconceived plan. With the "collapsible cor-
poration" the tax advantage is enjoyed deliberately rather than, so to
speak, by accident.
The purpose of this article is to examine critically the ta.~ treatment
of corporate liquidations. It is our view that President Truman's pro-
posal was doubly defective: by concentrating on the "collapsible corpora-
tion," it neglected the tax-avoiding potential of other corporate liquida-
tions; and by urging legislation, it underestimated the possibility of clos-
ing the loophole without additionallegislation.1
THE "COLLAPSmLE CORPORATION"
Even the meager description of the "collapsible corporation" in the
President's message will have brought to any ta.~ lawyer's mind cases like
Higgins v. Smith 8 and Lucas v. Earl. 9 Unless there are mitigating cir-
5I.RC. §1l5(c). Less indulgent treatment prevailed from 1934 to 1936, ifl!ra note 39.
The teJ.."t assumes that the stock is a "capital asset" under section 117(a) ; the assumption
is not valid for dealers in securities. But even they are tn.xed only on the gain or loss
realized by liquidation, not on the accumulated earnings and profits. The same is true
of taxpayers who have held the stock for si.x months or less. S~c also the special
treatment of foreign personal holding companies (§1l5(c), last sentence).
6See p. 455 infra.
1 Indeed, the President's legislative proposal will return to haunt the Trcnsury. Since
it came close to admitting that legislation,was necesSaI1', it prejudices an attack on the
"collapsible corporation" under existing law. See statement of Mr. Ellsworth C. Ah·ord,
on behalf of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States, before the House Committee
on \Vays and Means, Feb. 28, 1950. The slip may not be fatal, for some leewa}' must
be allowed in advocacy and the Treasury was careful to emphasize that doubt exists
even under present law as to the propriety of the scheme. Moreover, even the Presi-
dent's statement said only that the tn.xpayers "might escape •.• the tn.-.- they should P3}·."
8308 U.S. 473 (1940).
9281 U.S. 111 (1930).
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cumstances which have not been made public, the scheme is subject to
attack under present law. Indeed, the Treasury's major problem is to
choose from among a variety of theories, each of which would deny to
the "collapsible corporation" the tax advantages it seeks. Among these
theories are the three which follow:
1. Stock as Compensation. The creation of the "collapsible corpora~
tion" is attended by an understanding, explicit or implicit, that the share~
holders will perform services in the production 0 f the film either without
salary or for a salary which is less than the fair value of the services. tO
And that understanding imparts to the stock a potentiality of great value.
Though of course it would be impossible at the outset of the venture to
predict the ultimate return which the shares will earn, no shareholder
would be willing to sell his shares for what they cost him. Performance
of the services as the film is produced is in compliance with that same
understanding, even though it be only implicit: in serving without salary,
the shareholders are not making a contribution to a charity.11 Nor are
the shareholders the only parties to the understanding, for lenders adw
vancing funds to the corporation act in reliance upon the promise of the
shareholders that the expected services will be forthcoming.12
10 Instead of services, one of the shareholders may contribute a story or script. The
authors understand that the shareholders who perform services sometimes receive their
"established" salaries from the corporation. The tax advantage in such cases would
be minimized. Such corporations are less vulnerable to attack, though even here the
shareholders are receiving as a capital gain on liquidation a share of the film's profits
which, in the case of a continuing corporation, would be received as payment for services
or as dividends taxable as ordinary income.
11 Supra note 10. This suggests still another argument, mentioned only to evidence
the wealth of theories available to the Treasury. The performance of the services, though
without salary, might be considered as the equivalent of (1) a realization by the indi-
vidual of their fair market value, followed by (2) a transfer of that value as a capital
contribution to the corporation. The tax consequences would be (1) ordinary income
to the amount of the value of the services and (2) an increase in the shareholder's basis
for his stock. (Consider in this connection the recent rulings on gifts of property not
yet taken into income, discussed by Miller, Gifts of Income AmI of Property: What the
Horst Case Decides, 5 TAX L. REv. 1 (1949).) Though this analysis may superficiatly
seem far-fetched, is the transaction so different from the familiar receipt of stock as
compensation for services? If the individual already owns the corporation, the per-
formance of services without salary increases his equity in the corporation; he is benefited
as much by an increase in the value of the shares he now owns as he would be by an
additional issue of stock. Should the tax consequences of the two situations differ? Of
course, in the usual case of stock compensation, the value of the shares received reflects
primarily the other assets of the corporation, and only incidentally the assets created
by the services thus compensated. Moreover, ordinarily the compensatory shares have an
easily ascertainable value. In the case of the "collapsible corporation," the increase in the
shareholder's equity resulting from his (otherwise) uncompensated services may resist
valuation.
12 If title to the shares is conditioned upon performance of the services, a restriction
which lenders or the other shareholders might exact, it could be argued that compensation
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Viewed in this light, the device is seen as a method of compensating
the shareholders for their services either ( 1) by permitting them to
purchase stock for less than its fair value, or (2) by transferring to them
the corporation's liquidating distribution, or (3) by paying to them the
ultimate profits of the venture.
The receipt of stock as compensation for services is not uncommon, nor
is it uncommon for an employee to receive for his services the opportunity
to purchase stock for less than its fair market value. In the one case, the
full value of the stock, in the other, the "spread," must be reported by
the employee-shareholder as ordinary income.13 Even if the payment were
for services to be rendered in the future, the value of the stock or the
"spread" between cost and value would be so reported. In such cases, the
present value of the stock is crucial; the stockholder is not thinking of its
liquidating value, except to the incidental e.xtent that it enters into the
computation of present value. The peculiarity of the "collapsible corpora-
tion" is that the principal element of value in its stock is the anticipated
liquidating distribution, the amount of which cannot be estimated at the
time the stock is acquired. That uncertainty may require a postponement
of the tax reckoning, but it cannot be used to escape the reckoning. The
shareholder is comparable to the individual who agrees to perform services
in return for a percentage of an enterprise's profits. Since the value of his
interest in the profits can not be determined at the time, the proceeds will
be reported as income as they are received.
If, then, uncertainty in its value prevents reporting the stock in the
"collapsible corporation" as compensation when received, there will have
to be an accounting at a later date. This might be at the time of the
liquidating distribution, the practice apparently being to liquidate the cor-
poration as soon after the film's completion as its probable success can
be gauged. Another possibility, especially if the value at the time of
liquidation were too speculative, would be to report as income the profits
of the film as they are received in subsequent periods.H In other in-
dustries, if there is no intermediate period at which future profits can be
estimated with any degree of accuracy, the only feasible time of reporting
would be upon receipt of the profits. It may be argued that the foregoing
suggestions are a distorted reconstruction of the actual venture. We
suggest, to the contrary, that if the individuals involved were questioned
in the form of stock is received when the condition is satisfied. At that time, the value
of the shares would be more capable of estimate than when the corporation ,,:as first
organized. Bllt see Chaplin v. Comm'r, 136 F. 2d 298 (C.C.A.9th 1943).
13 Reg. 111, Sec. 29.22(a)-1.
14 Eisenstein has trenchantly discussed the choice in reporting income between the
date a contract right is acquired and the date the payments thereunder are received.
Eisenstein, A Case of Deferred Compellsation, 4 TA..,. L. REv. 391, 402-419 (1949).
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in the absence of their accountants and attorneys they would reply that
they were paid for their services and that the pay was the stock, the
liquidating distribution, or-more probably-the profits ultimately realized
from release of the film. And we suggest that, if the issue were tested in
court, the judicial response would be closer to the answer of the individual
performers than to those of their lawyers.un
2. Lucas v. Earl. The security of the "collapsible corporation" is also
threatened by a line of decisions stemming from Lucas v. Earl.10 There
the Supreme Court, when the federal income tax was still in comparative
infancy, held that an assignment by one person to another of income to
be earned in the future by the assignor's personal services was ineffective
for tax purposes:
There is no doubt that the statute could tax salaries to those who earned them
and provide that the tax could not be escaped by anticipatory arrangements and
contracts however skillfully devised to prevent the salary when paid from
vesting even for a second in the man who earned it.1G
The Court assumed that the assignment was valid under state law and,
even more significant, regarded the motive of the taxpayer as irrelevant;
in point of fact, the assignment was executed more than a decade before
the Sixteenth Amendment was adopted. Lucas v. Earl did not rest upon
the close relationship of the parties, though they were husband and wife.
The assignment would have been equally ineffective if the assignee had
been a friend whom Earl had wished to benefit, a charitable organization,
or even a speculator who had paid for the assignment.
Moreover-and this bears on the relationship between Lucas v. Earl
and the "collapsible corporation"-the arrangement is ineffective "how-
ever skillfully devised." The simple case is an assignment of future salary,
but even Lucas v. Earl involved the ta.xability of both salary and fees
received by the assignee but earned by the assignor. Suppose instead that
Earl had agreed to engage in professional services at his wife's direction
and that she "contracted out" his skill to others. Unless Lucas v. Earl
was a brutum fulmen, income created in this manner would have to be
taxed to Earl as were the salaries and fees actually assigned by him to
his wife. To bring the "collapsible corporation" even closer into focus,
let us assume that Mrs. Earl was a theatrical producer and that Mr. Earl,
a matinee idol, agreed to perform gratuitously or for an inadequate .
salary, in a show produced by her. Again, if Lucas v. Earl is not to be
Un Relevant is the much-publicized announcement of Jan. 3, 1948 that "proposals •••
to obtain compensation for personal services under the guise of sales of property can-
not be regarded as coming within the capital gains provisions of the Internal Revenue
Code." Mintz, Entertainers alld the Capital Gains Ta.'r, 4 TAX L. REv. 275 (1949).
15 281 U.S. 111 (1930).
16 ld. at 114-1is.
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outwitted by a "skillfully devised" contract, Mr. Earl would have to
report a portion of Mrs. Earl's profits as compensation for his own per-
sonal services. If both invested their talent or their capital, an allocation
of the profits would be necessary in order to disentangle their proper
shares, but this difficulty should not be allowed to undermine the principle
of Lucas v. Earl. In fact, an "anticipatory arrangement" by which the
income of personal labor is shifted to a controlled corporation would be
more easily disregarded than a transfer to another person. Under the
weight of Lucas v. Earl then, the "collapsible corporation" collapses pre-
maturely.
Later decisions of the Supreme Court, reinforcing and e.xtending Lucas
v. Earl, further confirm its applicability to the "collapsible corporation."
They are so familiar as to require no more than citation.1T Some pursue
the question of "who worked for, otherwise created or controlled the
income." 18 One does not have to subscribe to the labor theory of value
to conclude that the source of the income of the "collapsible corporation"
is the personal services of the shareholder-employees. Another group of
cases, more searching (or cynical) than Lucas v. Earl, asks: Did the
assignor feel any poorer after he disposed of the income? Or was the
device merely one by which "what is in reality but one economic unit . . .
[is] multiplied into two or more"? 19 Again, the "collapsible corporation"
will find the answers embarrassing.
It will perhaps be suggested that these cases are irrelevant because they
involve the assignment of income by one ta.""payer to another. The "col-
lapsible corporation," on the other hand, is liquidated before any income
is realized and hence is not the "assignee" of income. This is true, at
least in the case of the typical motion picture corporation, but the con-
clusion is a non sequitur. Lucas v. Earl was pointed not at "assignments"
alone, but at the entire range of "anticipatory arrangements and contracts
however skillfully devised to prevent the salary from vesting ... in the
man who earned it." The fact that the corporation escapes ta.,,-ation by
cleverly liquidating before the income is actually received, or even before
it is accruable,20 is forlorn support for distinguishing away Lflcas v. Earl.
The distribution contracts made by the corporation and the profits of those
contracts are the fruit of the individuals' services. Lucas v. Earl and its
widening circle of related decisions require that the fruit be ta."i:ed to the
17 Infra notes 18 and 19.
18 Comm'r v. Tower, 327 U.S. 280, 290 (1946); Burnet Y. Leininger, 285 U.S. 136
(1932); Helvering v. Eubank, 311 U.S. 122 (1940).
19 Helvering v. Oifford, 309 U.S. 331, 335 (1940); Comm'r Y. Sunncn, 333 U.S. 591
(1948).
20 If is possible, moreover, that some "collapsiblc corporations" receivc or accruc
the profits of the venture before liquidating.
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tree. Reporting the proceeds of liquidation as a capital gain is not enough.
It is remuneration for personal services and must be so reported.
3. Commissioner v. Laughton; Higgins v. Smith. The foregoing
theories have accepted the "collapsible corporation" as a bona fide entity
apart from its shareholders. Now that premise must be put to the test.
In Commissioner v. Laughton 21 it was held that income received in
form by a corporation is to be imputed to a shareholder-employee if his
"hiring of himself to [the corporation] for a salary substantially less than
the compensation for which the corporation supplied his services as its
employee to various motion picture producers, constituted, in effect, a
single transaction by [him] in which he received indirectly the larger sum
paid by the producers." The Court held that this was the proper criterion,
in the face of uncontradicted testimony that the motive was not tax avoid~
ance and even though the Board of Ta..'{ Appeals had found that the
corporation "was a business organization, managed by businessmen, and
created for business reasons." 22
The Laughton decision is the more significant in that the "incorporated
talent" practice there disclosed was the subject of a specific provision in
the personal holding company sections of the Internal Revenue Code. ~a
This provision, added in 1937, was not applicable to the earlier years
involved in the Laughton case, but the change had occurred before the
case was decided. The Court's decision shows that the personal holding
company sections, though they were expected by Congress to "take care
of the 'incorporated talent' loophole," 24 are not the only string to the
Treasury's bow. A corporation gets no tax immunity merely because it
manages to elude the mechanical tests 26 which govern the applicability
of those sections.
The "collapsible corporation" contemplates a group of persons who
receive, instead of a salary or a direct share of profits, stock worth com-
paratively little at the time, intending to realize their reward at a later
time through liquidation of the corporation. The scheme does not differ
in fundamentals from the plan considered in the Laughton case. Instead
of a single individual, the "collapsible corporation" represents a group of
21 113 F.2d 103 (C.C.A.9th 1940). On remand, a decision was entered in conformity
with a stipulation between the parties under which tax deficiencies of about $24,000 were
assessed.
2240 B.T.A. 101, 106 (1939), renwnded, 113 F.2d 103, 104 (C.C.A.9th 1940).
23 LR.C. §502(e).
24 H. R. REp. No. 1546, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1939-1 (Part 2) CUM. BULL.
704, 707; Rudick, Sectioll 102 aitd Personal Holding CompatlY Provisions of lite Itl/emal
Reveul/e Code, 49 YALE L. J. 171, 177 (1939).
26 The tax is applicable only if (a) more than 50% in value of the corporation's stock
is owned directly or indirectly by five individuals or less, and (b) at least 80% of its
gross income is "personal holding company income." LR.C. §§501 (a) and 502.
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individuals; diversification may shield the corporation from the personal
holding company provisions of the statute ~6 but should not immunize
it from the criterion of taxability applied in the LallglJtoll casc. Instcad
of "hiring out" the shareholder-employees' services, the "collapsible cor-
poration" makes direct use of their services and disposes of the product.
Again, that fact may prevent application of the personal holding company
sections, where Congress has chosen to penalize income "receivcd under
a contract under which the corporation is to furnish personal services." ~:
It does not protect the individuals from the Lallghton criterion of whether
the income was received in effect, albeit indirectly, by thcm.
Nor are the facts of the Laughton case more susceptible to tile chargc
of "single transaction" than the facts in the "collapsiblc corporation"
situation. Laughton entered into a five-year contract with his corporation;
at least some of the income which could have bcen ta.xed to him undcr
the Court's holding carne from contracts between the corporation and
third parties which were not arranged at the time the corporation was
organized. In the case of the "collapsible corporation," howcver, the
prospective shareholders know at the time of incorporation tile very enter-
prise from which their future profits will arise. Moreover, the liquidation
of the corporation places the profits of the enterprise directly in the hands
of the shareholder. If anything, then, the "collapsible corporation" is
more easily viewed as a "single transaction" than were the facts of the
Laughton case, where the corporation was not promptly liquidated. Of
course, where the shareholder's services are "contracted out" by the cor-
poration, it receives a fixed compensation, while tile income of the "col-
lapsible corporation" is dependent upon the success of the enterprise. Yet
this distinction hardly stands in the way of the "single transaction"
rationale: if a perfornler is willing to take a share of profits as com-
pensation for his services, should his ta.x be lower because the profits have
been filtered through a corporation?
The Laughton decision does not stand alone in refusing to honor the
form of separate corporate existence. It was based on a Supreme Court
decision, Higgins v. Smith/8 also relevant to the case of the "collapsiblc
corporation." There a taA-payer was denied a deduction for a loss incurred
by selling property, at its fair market value, to a corporation wholly owned
by him. The Supreme Court held that tile District Court had properly
instructed the jury that the critical question was whether the sale was
"a transfer by Mr. Smith's left hand, being his individual hand, into his
26 Supra note 25.
21 I.R.C. §502 (e). If the corporation itself received the proceeds of the film's distri-
bution, however, it might be contended that they were "royalties" and not "rents:' Com-
pare I.R.e. §502(a) with LRC. §502(g).
28 308 U.S. 473 (1940).
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right hand, being his corporate hand, so that in truth and fact there was
no transfer at all." 29 (Parenthetically it may be noted that, as in the
Laughton case, the Court was unmoved by the fact that under later reve-
nue acts the very abuse with which it was concerned was outlawed by a
specific statutory provision not in force in the year in question.SO) Other
cases, it is true, have denied the shareholder of a wholly-owned corpora-
tion the privilege of combining the corporation's income and his own,
holding that even the "one-man" corporation must pay the corporate tax
on its own income.31 But they were cases where the taxpayer tried to
shift his position after he "had adopted the corporate form for purposes
of his own," 32 and they do not foreclose the Commissioner from disre-
garding the corporate entity. In Higgins v. Smith itself the Court said:
A taxpayer is free to adopt such organization for his affairs as he may
choose and having elected to do some business as a corporation, he must
accept the tax disadvantages.
On the other hand, the Government may not be required to acquiesce in
the taxpayer's election of that form for doing business which is most advan-
tageous to him. The Government may look at actualities and upon determina-
tion that the form employed for doing business or carrying out the challenged
tax event is unreal or a sham may sustain or disregard the effect of the fiction
as best serves the purpose of the tax statute.S3
Applying the rationale of Higgins v. Smith and the Laughton case, then,
the activities of the "collapsible corporation," as well as its earnings, if
there are any, might well be attributed to its stockholders.
Must this line of argument be rejected because it carries too far? All
corporations, in a sense, are the instruments or dummies of their share-
holders; 34 and this is true in a realistic sense of close corporations where
there is no gap between the shareholders and the management. Hence a
broad construction of Higgins v. Smith, it will be asserted, would lead to
the conclusion that corporate earnings are always "in reality" the earnings
29 Id. at 475.
30 I.R.C. §24(b) (1) (B), first enacted by Sec. 24(a) (6) of the Revenue Act of 1934,
48 STAT. 680, 691.
31 Moline Properties, Inc. v. Comm'r, 319 U.S. 436 (1943); see National Carbide
Corp. v. Comm'r, 336 U.S. 422 (1949); Burnet v. Commonwealth Improvement Co.,
287 U.S. 415 (1932); see Geary, The Corporate Entity ill Ta% Cases, 1 TAo" L. REv. 3
(1945); Finkelstein, The Corporate Entity and the Income Ta%, 44 YALE L. J. 436
(1935).
32 319 U.S. 436, 439 (1943).
33308 U.S. 473, 477 (1940). And see Comm'r v. Smith, 136 F.2d 556 (C.C.A.2d 1943),
involving the same corporation. The corporation may be disregarded by the Treasury
for one purpose and not for another. O'Neill v. Comm'r, 170 F.2d 596 (C.C.A.2d 1948),
cert. deuied., 336 U.S. 937 (1949).
34 See National Carbide Corp. v. Comm'r, 336 U.S. 422, 433 (1949); United States v.
South Buffalo R. Co., 333 U.S. 771, 784-785 (1948).
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of, and taxable to, the shareholders. Conscious of the dilemma, courts
have sought to escape it by labelling the Higgi1ls v. Smith corporation a
"sham." 35 This does not mean that it lacked a charter, that its owner
had failed to observe all corporate formalities in the past, or that he in-
tended to ignore them in the future, when it might suit his purpose to do
so. Nor does it appear to rest on a finding that the shareholder incor-
porated to avoid taxes rather than to limit his liability j the loss would
have been disallowed even if the corporation operated a mine or a mill.
The label "sham," in short, is not referable to any state of facts; it
represents rather a conviction that justice will best be served by ignoring
the corporate entity. And when the District Judge in Higgins v. Smith
charged the jury in the words quoted above, he too was seeking to avoid
the dilemma by instructing the jury to find as a "fact" something that
is not a "fact."
Facing the issue instead of hiding it in the jury room or trial judge's
chambers, however, engenders insecurity. For-we might as well recog-
nize it-there are only imperceptible differences of degree between the
one-man "incorporated pocket book" and tile one-man corporation which
carries on a manufacturing business; tIlere are only differences of degree
between the one-man and the closely-held corporation, and so on. Does
this mean that there are no guide-posts to decision? Not necessarily.
One reasonable criterion is this: \;Vas the corporation brought into being
or the transaction framed as it was in response to business reasons of a
non-tax variety, or was the main purpose an avoidance of ta.xes? The
"one-man" grocery store may be incorporated to limit the operator's
liability; it may therefore be thought proper to treat it as a separate entity
for tax purposes. No doubt the shareholders of the "collapsible corpora-
tion" also desired limited liability in the production and marketing of
the film. And it is probably also true that the corporation is not liquidated
until the risks of operation have been weathered; hence liquidation has
the "business" purpose of bringing to an end a corporate entity which
has lost its usefulness. But protection against personal liability for the
risks of the enterprise could be as readily obtained if a corporation agreed
to pay the performers a share of the profits as compensation. The reason
they serve without compensation is to reduce their taxes, and this reason
may condemn the scheme. Surely tile lenders who finance the corpora-
tion's activities do so because of the understanding that the shareholders
will serve without compensation; to those lenders the corporation does
not stand on its own feet.
It must be admitted that this area is one of shifting sands, with hazy
boundary lines. However often we acknowledge that the drawing of lines
35 National Carbide Corp. v. Comm'r, 336 U.S. 422, 437, n. 20 (1949).
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is the judicial task par excellence, it is only grudgingly that one accepts
the idea that the earnings of a corporation may be taxed to a shareholder
where it seems to a court just to do so. The trepidation of tax lawyers at
the approach of such roguish concepts as equity and justice is enormous,
being matched in fact only by the reverence accorded to those concepts
on ceremonial occasions and when tax "relief" is sought. Yet there is no
escape. Even the "collapsible corporation" must be measured by those
standards. And it is likely to be found wanting.
COMPLETE LIQUIDATIONS
It has already been pointed out that the peculiar characteristic of the
"collapsible corporation" is a plan at the time of creation to take ultimate
advantage' of the Code's generous treatment of corporate liquidations.
But that generosity is attractive to other corporations as well, offering to
all an equal opportunity to spare their shareholders the rigors of individual
income tax rates by paying out accumulated earnings and profits as liqui-
dating distributions rather than as ordinary dividends. Is the Code overly
generous? The balance of this article is addressed to this question, first
as respects complete liquidations, and then as to partial liquidations.
So long as a sale of shares is a capital transaction regardless of the
extent of undistributed earnings and profits, it will be urged that a com-
plete liquidation ought to be treated similarly. This point of view com-
mended itself to Congress in 1924. In reporting the bill which became
the Revenue Act of 1924, the Senate Finance Committee said:
The bill treats a liquidating dividend as a sale of the stock, with the result
that the gain to the taxpayer is treated not as a dividend subject only to the
surtax but as a gain from the sale of property which may be treated as a
capital gain. . . . A liquidating dividend is, in effect, a sale by the stockholder
of his stock to the corporation; he surrenders his interest in the corporation
and receives money in place thereof. Treating such a transaction as a sale
, and within the capital gain provisions is consistent with the entire theory of
the Act and, furthermore, is the only method of treating such distributions
which can be easily administered.aa
The analogy of a liquidation to a sale of the stock has held sway ever
since, except for one brief period,31 and is now embodied in section 115 (c)
of the Internal Revenue Code.
36 SEN. REp. No. 398, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 1939-1 (Part 2) CUM. BULL. 266, 274.
31 Section 115(e) of the Revenue Act of 1934 provided that any gain (excess of amount
received over basis) realized upon a complete liquidation would be taxed as a short-term
capital gain, regardless of the time the shares had been held. But a loss thus realized
was subject to the percentage reduction of section 117 (a), graduated according to the
holding period applicable to the shares. The House Committee on Ways and Means
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But the analogy is imperfect. A sale of shares merely substitutes one
shareholder for another, leaving the corporation's earnings and profits
account intact. The result is that the earnings and profits will be taxed
as ordinary income if and when they are distributed to the new share-
holder; the outgoing shareholder furnishes the Government with a sur-
rogate, as it were, whose withdrawal of the corporate earnings will be
subjected to the graduated individual income ta.x rate. But on a complete
liquidation, no one steps into the shoes of the original shareholder. The
earnings and profits account-representing, be it remembered, income
which has so far escaped the individual income ta.x because its distribu-
tion has been postponed-is wiped clean. A sale of shares, then, merely
put off the day of reckoning; a complete liquidation guarantees that there
will be no reckoning, other than a recognition of capital gain or loss.
Liquidation may differ from sale in another respect. I f the assets are
not converted into cash but rather are distributed in kind, the liquidation
e>..-plained its recommendation as follows (H. R. REp. No. 704, 73d Cong., 2d Sess.. 1939-1
(Part 2) CUM. BULL. 554, 576) :
"Under existing law, a distribution in liquidation of a corporation is treated in the
same manner as a sale of stock. This rule has serious objections, as it permits wealth)·
stockholders to escape surtax upon corporate earnings or profits distributed in the
form of liquidating dividends. For instance, a corporation ma)' havc a surplus of
$1,000,000. If the surplus is distributed as an ordinary dividend it is subject to the surta."<:
rates in the hands of the shareholders. If it is distributed as a liquidatin~ dh'idend it is
subject only to the flat capital gain rate of 12! per cent in case tile sharcholdcr has held
his stock for more than two years. Your committce recognizes that liquidating dividends
do contain some of the elements of a sale in that tile shareholder is relinquishing in wholc
or in part his investment in the corporation.
"On the other hand, they also contain some of the clements of an ordinary dhidend
in so far as they represent a distribution of corporate earnings or profits.
"The bill retains the principle of the present law of ta.xing to tllC shareholder only
the amount by which the liquidating dividend e.xcccds tllC basis of tllC stock with respect
to which the dividend is paid. However, to prcvent avoidance of surta.x through liquidat-
ing dividend, the gain to shareholder is madc subject to botll normal and surta-x. This
is accomplished by taxing tile gain in the same manncr as if it wcrc a gain from a salc
or exchange of a capital asset held for not morc than one year, cven though the share-
holder may have actually held the stock upon which the dh'idend is p:lid for a longcr
period. But if a loss results from a liquidation of stock. tllC loss i.. treated as a loss
resulting from a sale or exchange of a capital asset and is thcreforc subject to thc
provisions of section 117 of the bill."
This treatment came to an end in 1936, when the Rcvenue Act of 1936 returned to
the pre-1934 meiliod of taxing complete liquidations. Thc changc was ilius justified b)'
the House Committee on Ways and :Means (H. R. REP. ·No. 2475, 74t11 Cong., 2d Sess.,
1939-1 (Part 2) CUM. Buu.. 667, 674:
"Section 115(c) has been revised so as to permit tllC shareholders (oilicr th..m cor-
porations) of a corporation, which is complctely liquidated \\itllin a 2-}'ear period, to be
taxed on the resulting gain under the provisions of section 117(a). The last-mentioned
section allows a ta.xpayer to take into account in computing net income only a certain
portion of the gain, varying according to the lengili of time for which he has owned
the stock. The present rule which requires a ta.'\.-payer in such a case to be ta."cd on
100 per cent of the gain is preventing liquidation of man)' corporations. Thus. we arc
getting very little tax under the strict rule now provided. It is believed that tlle result
of this modification in the meiliod of ta.xing gains arising from complete liquidation will
bring about a substantial increase in the revcnue."
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does not spell an end to the shareholder's interest in the enterprise. Instead
of "selling out," he has only changed the fashion in which he holds title to
the assets. Like the shareholder who sells out, he has enjoyed the benefits
of operating the enterprise in corporate form. Unlike the vendor of shares,
however, he is able to switch the business unit when the corporate form
becomes unattractive without losing his investment position. Having
used the corporate shell as long as it served his purpose, he discards it
at will without paying a personal tax on the accumulated earnings and
profits.
But is there a satisfactory alternative to taxing complete liquidations
like sales? If liquidations were taxed more stringently than sales, it may
be argued, the shareholders of a corporation contemplating liquidation
could exploit the more generous tax treatment of sales by selling their
shares just before the liquidation. The fear is not wholly unfounded.
But the buyer would know that he would bear the brunt of the strict
treatment of liquidations, and this would impair the feasibility of such
an evasion. The prospective buyer's knowledge of the impending liquidaM
tion, in other words, would impel him to discount his offering price for
the shares. A residual tax advantage would remain if the prospective
buyer were in a low tax bracket or if he had offsetting losses. Even this
advantage would disappear if liquidation followed sale so closely as to
justify application of the "single transaction" rule. For then the buyer
would be treated as the seller's "agent" or as the "conduit" through which
the seller had received the liquidating distribution.38
Assuming that disparate tax consequences for liquidations and sales
could be protected against evasion, then, what form might a change take?
Putting liquidating distributions on a par with ordinary distributions
is the simplest: the distribution would be taxable as ordinary income to
the extent of the corporation's accumulated earnings and profits; the
balance of the distribution would give rise to capital gain if it exceeded
the basis of the stock or to capital loss if it were less than that basis. This
treatment prevailed under the Acts of 1916, 1917, and 1921.30 By taxing
in the year of liquidation the distribution of earnings and profits which
may have been accumulated over a period of years, this method may be
very harsh. And it might promote unsound dividend policies by corporaM
tions whose liquidation a few years hence is a possibility; the shareholders
38 For a suggestive recent analogy, see Conrad N. Hilton, 13 T.C. 623 (1949): Her-
man M. Rhodes, 43 B.T.A. 780 (1941). A similar problem is dealt with by DeWind,
Preferred Stock "Bail-Onts" alld the Illcome Tax, 62 HARv. L. REV. 1126, 1132-35 (1949) :
Darrell, Recellt Developmellts ill NOlltaxable Reorgalli:::atiolls alld Stoe!: Dividellds,
61 HARv. L. REV. 958, 969-972 (1948).
30 Comment, Illcome Taxatioll of Liqllidatillg Dividellds, 47 YALE L. J. 1146, 1147 n. 7,
1148 n. 12 (1938).
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would be tempted to distribute earnings currently rathcr than accumulate
them for distribution on liquidation.
Several devices come to mind to mitigate the incquity of pyramiding
the tax. The portion of the liquidating distribution which rcpresents
earnings and profits could be taxed as though it had been receivcd in equal
installments over the previous three years-a fireside cquity which has
commended it:.?elf in other connections.~o Another concession would prob-
ably be desirable to protect the investor who buys into a corporation with
a large accumulation of earnings and profits just before a liquidation,
especially one that is not foreseen by him. For the suggcsted change
would require him to report part of the distribution (the earnings and
profits) as ordinary income, though realistically it is a return of his in-
vestment.4J. The resulting capital loss (his basis less the balance of the
liquidating distribution) might be of little use to him in that year or
even during the entire carry-over period. The proposed r<:medy for this
problem is to permit his capital loss to be deducted from ordinary income
to the extent of the earnings and profits represented by tlle rest of the
liquidating distribution.
"\Vhatever the merits of a change, however, the Internal Revenue Code
still adheres to the 1924 analogy of liquidation to sale. The legal issues
in its administration, unlike those arising in connection willi partial liqui-
dations, have been few in number.
What Is a "Complete Liquidation"? The phrase "complete liquidation"
is not defined by the Code 42 or by the regulations. Nor does the term have
a recognized meaning which can be carried over from state corporation
law.43 Apparently somelliing less tllan dissolution under state law rna)'
be a "complete liquidation" under section US(c) of the Code. In KCIIIIC-
mer v. Commissioner/4 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld
the Commissioner's assertion that a corporation had been liquidated where
it had distributed substantially all of its assets, retaining only enough
to pay its debts, had suspended business operations, and had allowed its
charter to lapse for non-payment of the state franchise ta."\:. There was
no formal resolution to dissolve, no compliance with state dissolution
40 See LRC. §107.
4J. Of the course, the phenomenon occurs in a less exaggerated form whenever one
buys a share before declaration of a dividend from earnings and profits accumu1:l.ted
before the purchase. Powell, Incollle from Corporatc Dit>idcnds, 35 HAR\'. L. REv. 363
(1922).
42 Section 112(b) (6) carries what might be termed a definition, but the definition is
"for the purposes" of that paragraph only.
43 State corporation statutes employ the terms "winding up" and "dissolution" rather
than ''liquidation.'' See generally BALLANTI2>TE ON CORPORATIONS Co xx (rev. cd. 1946),
and STEVENS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAw OF PRI\'ATE CORPORATIONS Co 22 (2d ed. 1949).
4496 F. 2d 177 (C.C.A.5th 1938).
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procedure, and no surrender of shares; moreover, the corporation's charter
was revived within a year. This slighting of formalities is not out of
harmony with the purpose of the statute; if the Congressional analogy
between a sale of stock and a liquidation has any validity, it seems
appropriately applied whenever the shareholders get all the corporate assets
even if the charter of the corporation is not surrendered. If, after the
liquidation, the shareholders want to carry on another enterprise in cor-
porate form, should it matter in these days of cheap incorporation that
instead of procuring a new charter they employ the shell cast off by the
old enterprise?
Ordinarily it would probably be the taxpayer rather than the Commis-
sioner who would urge that a distribution met the requirements of "com-
plete liquidation," for one which did not might be in whole or in part an
ordinary dividend. Since the corporation has the power to insure the status
of "complete liquidation" by compliance with state dissolution procedure,
it may be argued that an insistence upon ritual is not unfair to the tax-
payer. But the United States hardly needs the shabby dollars that could
thus be exacted from the unwary.
And even the United States may lose-though more rarely-from a
definition of "complete liquidation" in terms of state dissolution. The
problem is suggested by a case in which a subsidiary corporation sold its
assets to its' parent, the subsidiary's only asset thereafter being a claim
against the parent for the unpaid sales price. Though the subsidiary was
dormant after the sale, it was kept alive by the parent's payment of fran-
chise and other taxes. The finding of the Board of Tax Appeals that the
subsidiary was not "liquidated" in the year its assets were transferred to
its shareholder was sustained on appeal.45 Thus, the parent has unfettered
use of the assets, but is able to postpone actual liquidation (i.e.) a sur-
render of its stock for cancellation of the subsidiary's claim) as long as
it desires. It can, therefore, liquidate the subsidiary in a year when the
recognition of gain on the surrender of its stock will be less painful or the
recognition of loss more useful.
Although parent and subsidiary corporations may no longer profit
from this scheme, because of a change in the statute,40 it is still open to
individual shareholders of a corporation to be liquidated. This maneuver
would be particularly attractive if the corporation's basis for the dis-
tributed assets is greater than their market value. For then the corpora-
tion, by selling the assets to its shareholders instead of distributing them
in liquidation, can take a loss on the sale.47 And, as stated, the tax con-
45 Comm'r v. American Liberty Oil Co., 127 F.2d 262 (C.C.A.5th 1942).
40 I.R.C. §112 (b) (6).
47 Subject to the limitation of I.R.C. §24(b).
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sequences to the shareholders of the liquidation (i.e., the difference be-
tween the shareholders' basis for the stock and the amount of the cor-
poration's claim against them) can be realized in the year of their choice.
Possibly this avenue of tax avoidance would be open only if there was a
business purpose in continuing the e.xistence of the corporation after the
"sale" of its assets to the shareholders, though it is difficult to conceive of
a purpose that could not be achieved as efficaciously by the prompt dissolu-
tion of the old corporation and the creation of a new one when required.
Moreover, there is some authority for declining to recognize a purported
sale of assets to shareholders as a genuine transaction, at least if a liquida-
tion is contemplated and follows promptly.~8
Liquidation and Reincorporation. Immediately after a corporation is
completely liquidated, the distributed assets may be transferred to a
second, newly organized corporation. The receipt of tlle assets by the
shareholders of the old corporation might be regarded as so transitory
a step that no economic gain or loss has resulted, though possibly only the
Commissioner would be in a position to disregard the formal liquidation.
But resort to general principle is unnecessary since the reorganization
provisions are directly in point. The transaction, viewed as a whole, is
appropriately classified as a "reorganization" resulting in tlle non-recog;:.
nition of either gain or loss.~9 For when by pre-arrangement reincorpora-
tion follows liquidation, the transaction meets tlle statutory requirements
of both a "(C)" and a "(D)" reorganization. Section 112(g)(1)(C)
labels as a reorganization "the acquisition by one corporation, in e.,change
solely for all or a part of its voting stock, of substantially all tlle properties
of another corporation." And section 112 (g) (l)(D) classifies as a
reorganization "a transfer by a corporation of all or a part of its assets
to another corporation if immediately after tlle transfer the transferor or
its shareholders or both are in control of the corporation to which the
assets are transferred." ~o
48 Gaunt & Harris v. United States, 110 F.2d 651 (e.C.A.6th 1940); see France
Co. v. Comm'r, 88 F.2d 917 (e.C.A.6th 1937).
49 Survaunt v. Comm'r, 162 F.2d 753 (C.e.A.8th 1947). Of course, Iiternl compliance
with the statute is not enough, and gain or loss may be recognizable because the under-
lying assumptions of the "reorganization" provisions are not applicable to a particular
case. See, e.g., Standard Realization Co., 10 T.e. 708 (1948). But a transfer of assets
to a second controlled corporation should be no more-as it should be no lcss-\-ulnerable
if it follows a liquidation of the first corporation than if it precedes the liquidation.
~o In a comparable situation, the proper result is equally clear though it cannot be
achieved under the Code. The shareholders of the old corporation may cause its com-
plete liquidation and, in pursuance of a pre-arranged plan, transfer the assets thus
acquired to a corporation which they already control. If the acquiring corporation issues
no stock in exchange, there is no "(C)" or "(D)" reorganization, tllough the economic
position of the parties is no different than if the technical requirements of "reorganization"
had been met by an issue of additional stock in exchange for the assets.
Imaged with the Permission ofN.Y.U. Tax Law Review
HeinOnline -- 5 Tax L. Rev. 454 1949-1950
454 TAX LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5:
So far we have assumed that all of the assets received upon liquidation
of the first corporation are transferred by the shareholders to the second
corporation. 'What if only some of the assets are so transferred, the
balance being retained by the shareholders? A similar question arises if
the first corporation directly transfers some of its assets to the second,
in exchange for the second corporation's stock, and thereafter liquidates.
If a considerable part of the assets were thus held back, either by the first
corporation or by its shareholders, at the time of the transfer to the
second corporation, the transaction could not be a "(C)" reorganization,
since that requires the acquisition by the second corporation of "sub~
stantially all the properties" of the first. But the transfer would still
fit the definition of a "(D)" reorganization: "a transfer by a corporation
of all or a part of its assets" to a second corporation controlled by its
shareholders. Viewed analytically, the transaction is only a partial-
rather than a complete-liquidation of the enterprise, for part is being
continued in corporate form, though under another charter. From the
point of view of the shareholders, the transaction resembles a simple sur~
render to the original corporation of some of their shares (i.e.) to the
extent of the value of the assets they now hold in their individual capacity).
Unless the receipt by the shareholders of the unincorporated assets gives
rise to ordinary income (to the extent of the first corporation's earnings
or profits) rather than to capital gain or loss, the door would open to an
ingenious scheme of tax avoidance. The shareholders of a corporation
could refrain from paying dividends for a few years, then liquidate the
corporation, retain part of the assets in lieu of the withheld dividends,
reinvest the balance in a newly created corporation, and repeat the process
indefinitely. If accepted at face value, this scheme would permit the share-
holder to siphon off unneeded earnings and profits without ever report~
ing them as ordinary income. Without endeavoring to plumb the mysteries
of the reorganization provisions, the authors note that the suggested
device might run afoul of section 112(c) (2).Gl But even within the
confines of the liquidation sections, section 115 (g) would create certain
hazards for the shareholders who are fleeing from the clutches of section
115(a).
Section 115 (g) announces that if a corporation
cancels or redeems its stock . . . at such time and in stich manner as to make
the distribution and cancellation or redemption in whole or in part essentially
equivalent to the distribution of a taxable dividend, the amount so distributed
[to the extent of post-1913 earnings of profits] ... shall be treated as a
taxable dividend.
51 Lewis v. Comm'r, 176 F.2d 646 (C.C.A.1st 1949).
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This section is customarily thought of as a hazard which must be over-
come only by partial liquidations, and the authors will discuss it more
fully in the next portion of the article. But has it no place in a discussion
of complete liquidations? The regulations state that section 115 (g) is
not applicable to a "bona fide" distribution in complete liquidation of the
corporation.52 In 1926 the Senate Finance Committee on 'Vays and
Means, reporting on a redrafted section 115 (g), said that it "obviously
does not apply in cases of complete liquidation of all the stock of the
corporation." 53 Yet perhaps the admonition in the regulations that only
"bona fide" distributions in complete liquidations may escape section
115(g) will bar the use of the ta.x avoidance device described above.ll~
For if the transfer of some assets to a new corporation closely precedes
or follows liquidation of the old, the bona fides of the shareholders will
be open to question, especially if the same (non-ta.x) economic results
would have been achieved by an ordinary dividend (or a partial liquida-
tion) by the old corporation. But except for a situation of this type,
section 115(g) is not a threat to complete liquidations.
PARTIAL LIQUIDATION
Short of closing up shop, a corporation may distribute assets to its
shareholders for many reasons. Business may have been profitable, re-
sulting in the accumulation of more cash than is needed for normal
operations. Perhaps the directors accumulated cash for an e.'\.1>ansion
which for one reason or another never occurred. Or the business may
have discontinued a particular line or branch as part of a general policy
of contraction.
. Once the decision is made that the business can get along with less
52 Reg. 111, Sec.' 29.115-9.
53 SEN. REP. No. 52, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., 1939-1 (Part 2) CUM. BuLL. 332, 344.
53a Ordinarily, as in the Le--cJJis case, supra note 51, the Commissioner will be satis-
fied to assert a tax under section 112(a) (2) on the distributed cash or propertj·. In fact.
treating the liquid assets as "boot" under section 112(e) (2) rather than as a liquidating
distribution under section 115(e), spares the Commissioner a difficult hurdlc. for a liqui-
dating distribution cannot be taxed as a dividend under section 115(g) if it reflects a
"legitimate shrinkage" of the business. See p. 471 ill/ra. Functional!}', howe\·cr. thc trans-
action in the Lewis case was a partial liquidation. On the other hand, there mal' be occa-
sions when the Commissioner will steer away from section 112(e)(2). preferring to face
the rigors of section 115(g), for section 112(e) (2) applies to "boot" onl}' if thcre has been
a "gain" on the exchange. Thus, if the shareholder's basis for the old stock e....ceeds the
value of what he gets in exchange, there can be no ta.... under section 112(e)(2) even
though there is "boot" which is made up of earnings and profits. In such cases, the
Commissioner might well fall back on the business purpose doctrine to disregard the pur-
ported reorganization (contrary to his position in the LcrLris case), argue that there
was either a partial liquidation or a non-bona fide complete liquidation. and take his
chances with section 115(g).
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capital, the directors have many ways of putting the decision into practical
effect. The simplest way is to distribute cash or other property to the
stockholders. If there were earnings and profits accumulated after March
1, 1913, the distribution would be taxed to the recipient as a dividend to
the extent of the post-1913 earnings. Or a reduction in the par value
of the capital stock could be voted. The resulting surplus would be taxable
as a dividend, to the extent of post-1913 earnings and profits, when
distributed.
But the directors might decide instead to distribute assets in exchange
for part of the stock of the shareholders. A transaction of this type may
take one of several forms. The corporation may retire the reacquired
shares in accordance with state law. The reacquired shares may, on the
other hand, be retained as treasury shares and treated in the various ways
which the rules of accounting have suggested for this type of reacquisi-
ton. 54 Finally, the reacquired shares might revert to the status of author-
ized but unissued shares. Regardless of which bookkeeping technique is
used in the reacquisition of the shares, the economic results are the same:
physical assets have been separated from the business in exchange for
shares of stock. There is no correlation between the economic facts which
give rise to the distribution and the bookkeeping entry used to describe
it. Nor will the corporation's future conduct be appreciably restricted or
altered by the use of one method instead of another. Certainly the eco-
nomic interest of the shareholder who has given up stock in exchange
for assets is not affected by the whims of bookkeeping. Yet despite the
underlying policy of tax law to treat like transactions alike, economically
similar transactions have received dissimilar treatment. It is obvious at
the outset that the transactions just described differ from complete liqui-
dations only in degree. In a complete liquidation all the assets are dis-
tributed in exchange for all the stock. But every distribution of assets is
a liquidation of sorts. Even the simple declaration of an ordinary divi-
dend without the surrender of stock is a liquidation in the sense that the
corporation has parted with a portion of its assets. And the reacquisition
of part of the outstanding stock resembles a complete liquidation even
more. The considerations which have been urged to justify a tax ad-
vantage to complete liquidations would seem to justify a similar benefit
to cases of partial liquidation. If a corporation curtails its operations,
why deny it the benefits which are extended to a corporation which termi-
nates its operations?
The Internal Revenue Code has provided a ready compliance with this
seductive reasoning. The cloak which section 115 (c) throws around
54 See Himmelblau, Balallce Sheet Presmtatioll of Treasury Stock, reprinted in'ScIIA.
PIRO & WIENSCHIENK, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAW AND ACCOUNTING 330 (1949),
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complete liquidations has been extended to partial liquidations as well.
Thus, when a corporation reacquires its stock in a partial liquidation,
the difference between the basis of the stock and the property transferred
to the stockholder is taxed at the capital gains rate,ns no matter how great
an amount of earnings and profits is distributed in the process. Section
U5(c) provides the most striking exception to the command of section
115 (a) that the term "dividend" means "any distribution made by a
corporation to its shareholders . . . out of earnings and profits."
But the tax avoidance possibilities which lurk in this treatment of
partial liquidations are obvious. A dominant stockholder who wants to
remove earnings from his business could cancel shares of stock in a partial
liquidation. Though funds received from the corporation are a distribu-
tion of earnings and profits, the stockholder would be taxed only on the
difference between the adjusted basis of the shares and the amount re-
ceived for them. And the tax would be at the capital gains rate. There
is no economic line between partial liquidations and ordinary dividends.
It was with serious qualms, therefore, that Congress, in 1942, decided to
extenq the complete benefits of section 115 (c) to partial liquidations.na
For the preceding six years, gains in partial liquidation were ta-xed in
full, like short-term capital gains.:i1 ';Vhen, in 1942, Congress provided
this tremendous opportunity for ta.x avoidance, it relied on another pro-
vision in the Code to plug the dike. Section 115(g) ta.xes as a dividend
any cancellation or redemption of stock which occurs "at such time and in
such manner as to make the distribution . . . in whole or in part essen-
tially equivalent to the distribution of a ta.xable dividend." n8
It would appear from these provisions that all partial liquidations
would have to stand the test of section 115(g). But section 115(g) comes
into play only when there has been a "redemption" or "cancellation." If
there has been a reacquisition of shares without a "cancellation or re-
demption," a "sale" has occurred resulting in a capital gain. In determin-
ing whether there has been a "sale" or a "partial liquidation,.. courts have
embarked on a confusing and, in our judgment, a meaningless task.
55 I.RC. §U5 (c): " ... amounts distributed in partial liquidation of a corporation
shall be treated as in part or full payment in e....change for the stock." Sf:(: Reg. 111,
Sec. 29.115-5.
56 Revenue Act of 1942, Sec. 147, 56 STAT. 841 (1942) (alllflldill9 I.R.c. §115(c».
51 Revenue Act of 1936, Sec. U5(c), 49 STAT. 1687 (1936). For a brief historical dis-
cussion of the changing treatments accorded partial liquidations, SfC 'Murph)', Parlial
Liqltidatiolls alld the New Look, 5 TAX L. REv. 73, 75-6 (1949).
58 In eliminating the inequality in 13." treatment of partial and complete liquidations,
the House Committee stated, "It is believed that 115(g) of the e....isting law is adequate
protection for preventing distributions in partial liquidation from being utilized to dis-
guise the taxation of a 13.....able dividend." H. R. REP. 1\0.2333, 77th Cong., 2d Scss. (1942),
1942-2 CUM. BULL. 372, 412.
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"Sale}} or "Partial Liquidation.}} Section 115 (c) permits distributions
in partial liquidation to be treated as payment for the surrendered stock
and thus enables the shareholder to report his profit as a capital gain.
But for tax purposes a partial liquidation occurs only if there has been
a "cancellation or redemption" of a part of the corporation's stock09 It
seems to be agreed that cancelled shares are those which have been
formally retired.69 But "redemption" might encompass any reacquisition
of shares by the corporation.61 The courts have interpreted the term,
however, more narrowly. The result is that the partial liquidation pro-
visions of the Code, sections 11 5 (c) and 115(g), have been called into
play only in certain types of reacquisitions. Other forms of reacquisitions
have been labelled "sale."
Upon this distinction, at best a formalistic one, turns the important
question of whether section 11 5(g) will apply. Before 1942, the distinc-
tion had even more serious tax consequences. From 1936 to 1942 gains
in partial liquidation were taxable in full as short-term capital gains,02
regardless of the period the shares had been held. But if a stockholder
69 LR.C. §115(i): "As used in this section the term 'amounts distributed in partial
liquidation' means a distribution by a corporation in complete cancellation or redemption
of a part of its stock, or one of a series of distributions in complete cancellation or
redemption of all or a portion of its stock."
60 The statute defines neither "cancellation" nor "redemption." It is generally assumed,
however, that cancellation of shares is synonymous with retirement. "The term 'can-
cellation of a share' ... is the customary term to indicate that on its retirement the
corporation shall lose the authority to reissue it or any new share in place of it." BALLAN-
TINE, CORPORATIONS 617 (rev. ed. 1946). In Alpers v. Comm'r, 126 F.2d 58 (C.C.A.2d
1942), Judge Swan recognized that a cancellation under section 115(i) was possible even
if there had been no retirement in accordance with state law.
61 In James D. Robinson, 27 B.T.A. 1018 (1934), the Court specifically stated that
"cancellation" and "redemption" were terms broad enough to include reacquisition of
treasury shares. See Alpers v. Comm'r, 126 F.2d 58 (C.C.A.2d 1942) (dissenting opinion
of Judge L. Hand).
"Redemption" of shares is a term which defies precise definition. The flexibility
involved in the redeeming of shares is indicated by the following excerpt from one
of the leading treatises on corporate law: "Redemption of preferred shares frequently
involves a reduction of legal capital, although not necessarily so, as preferred shares may
be redeemed out of surplus. This method of reduction is frequently not subject to the
general provisions as to reduction of capital, such as vote by the shareholders•••• If
redeemable shares are acquired from surplus, the surplus should be reduced. Cancellation
is not always compulsory. Shares redeemed from surplus may be carried as treasury
shares or as part of the authorized shares with powers in the directors to reissue them,
in the absence of some statute or charter provision forbidding their issue." BALLANTINE,
CORPORATIONS 620 (rev. ed. 1946).
Although "redemption" is a term usually applied to preferred shares, it is incon-
ceivable that section 115(g) was intended to limit the reacquisition of only preferred
shares. If common is included, it is difficult to see why any form of reacquisition could
not be covered by "redemption." See Murphy, Partial Liqllidaliolls alld llee New Look,
5 TAX L. REv. 73, 77-8 (1949).
62 Revenue Act of 1936, Sec. 115(c), 49 STAT. 1687 (1936).
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could convince a court that he had "sold" his shares to the corporation,
the gain would be taxed as a long-term capital gain provided he had held
the shares for the minimum holding period. By placing the transaction in
the "sale" catgory, then, the stockholder not only avoided the possibility
that the entire distribution would be ta.xed to him as a dividend under
section 115 (g), but also achieved more favorable treatment on the gain.
Thus, instead of deciding whether a reacquisition was essentially equiva-
lent to a dividend, courts were often shunted off on the side issue whether
the gain or loss to the stockholder resulting from the reacquisition should
be treated as if it resulted from a long-term or short-term transaction.
In deciding this question, courts set up a variety of criteria. The most
common was the distinction between shares held in the corporate treasury
and those which were cancelled or retired. The former represented shares
which had been "purchased" by the corporation; fl3 the latter were shares
which had been "cancelled or redeemed." fl4 This formalistic distinction
received its strongest recognition in Alpers v. Com11lissio"cr,fl~ decided
by the Second Circuit in 1942. The Court considered the retention of
shares in the corporate treasury as strong evidence that the corporation
did not intend a permanent distribution of surplus. Even a subsequently
formed intent to retire the shares did not satisfy the Court's strict re-
quirement that the intent to retire the shares be present at the time of
reacquisition.66 The absurdities of this distinction are obvious. The eco-
nomic consequences of retiring shares are virtually identical with those
which flow from retaining them as treasury shares. There is no basis in
common sense for the imposition of different ta.x consequences on these
substantially identical transactions.
The treasury stock distinction was not the only one used to throw
certain reacquisitions into the category of "sale," thus avoiding the un-
favorable pre-1942 treatment as a partial liquidation under section 115(c)
or possibly as a dividend under section 115Cg). If a small proportion of
the outstanding stock was transferred to the corporation,flT or if a small
number of stockholders disposed of their holdings,flB resulting in non-pro
63 Fox v. Harrison, 145 F2d 521 (C.C.A.7th 1944) ; Rollin C. RC}'11olds, 44 B.T.A. 342
(1941) ; w.. C. Robinson, 42 B.T.A. 725 (1940); William A. Smith, 38 B.T.A. 317 (1938).
But see note 72 infra.
64 Hill v. Comm'r, 126 F2d 570 (C.C.A.5th 1942); Ellene Z. Rosensteel, 46 B.T.A.
1184 (1942).
65 126 F2d 58 (C.C.A2d 1942).
66 See also Hadley v. Comm'r, 1 T.C. 496 (1943).
67 Alpers v. Comm'r, 126 F2d 58 (C.C.A2d 1942); William A. Smith, 38 B.T.A. 317
(1938).
68 Harter Bank & Trust Co. v. Gentsch, 60 F. Supp. 400 (N. D. Ohio 1945) ; Trust Co.
of Georgia v. United States, 60 F. Supp. 470 (Ct. CI. 1945) ; Henry M. Johnson, 3 TCM
930 (1944).
2
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rata distributions,60 courts were more apt to say "sale." In c1osely~held
corporations it would be fairly easy to dress up a reacquisition to fit the
"sale" category.
Equally formalistic arguments were used on the other side. In order to
call certain reacquisitions partial liquidations, it was necessary to find a
"cancellation or redemption." 70 If the reacquisition was pursuant to an
authorization in the stock certificate, it was more likely to be a redemp-
tion.7l Retirement of the shares, or even an "intent" eventually to retire
them, was considered conclusive proof of partialliquidation.72
Occasionally courts seemed to disregard formality and looked for an
intent to contract the business as an indication that a partial liquidation
had occurred.73 If this intent could be found, the transaction would be a
partial liquidation, even though the shares were held as treasury shares.14
But even in the application of this standard, courts could not divorce
themselves from the rigors of bookkeeping, for it was generally assumed
that there was a bona fide liquidation in the economic sense, if the shares
were not intended to be reissued. 7G And too often an intent not to reissue
was considered synonymous with formal retirement of the shares.7o Thus,
in many cases the standard of "intent" to contract business activity be~
came another prop for supporting the formal distinction between treasury
shares and retired shares.
An analysis of the various criteria used by courts to decide whether
to apply the partial liquidation sections of the Code serves no useful
function. All of them were addressed to the wrong question. When a
60 Trust Company of Georgia v. United States, 60 F. Supp. 470 (Ct. CI. 1945). The
fact that the distribution is non-pro rata is only rarely given as an express reason for
labelling the transaction as a "sale." But without c.'Cception the "sale" decisions all
involve non-pro rata distributions. See note 147 illfra.
70 However, in reaching the conclusion that a partial liquidation had occurred, courts
often gave fairly broad meaning to the words "redemption" and "cancellation." An
"intent" to liquidate was often more important than the formal treatment of the shart's.
See note 74 ill/ra.
7l Gladys e. Blum, 5 T.e. 303 (1945) (despite notation "treasury shares" on stock).
72 Cohen Trust v. Comm'r, 121 F2d 689 (e.C.A.3d 1941); James Irvine, 46 B.T.A.
246 (1942); Harmon P. Elliott, B.T.A. Memo. Dkt. 109291. P-H 1142,539 (1942):
Often an intent to retire could overcome the presumption of "sale" which accompanied
treatment as treasury shares. See, e.g., William Cochran, 4 T.C. 942 (1945); John H.
Fry, B.T.A. Memo. Dkt. 100931. P-H 1141,241 (1941).
73 R D. Merrill, 4 T.e. 955 (1945); William Cochran, 4 T.e. 942 (1945); Harold F.
Hadley, 1 T.e. 496 (1943). COlltra: John M. Hathaway, 4 TCM 646 (1945) ; William S.
Fox, B.T.A. Memo. Dkt. 92120. P-H 1139,325 (1939).
74 William Cochran, 4 T.C. 942 (1945).
75 Cases cited note 73 supra. Alpers v. Comm'r, 126 F.2d 58 (e.C.A2d 1942) (no
permanent distribution of surplus if shares are intended to be reissued).
76 Ellene Z. Rosensteel, 46 B.T.A. 1184 (1940); Marie Hammans, B.T.A. Memo. Dkt.
96504. P-H lf40,300 (1940); ct. w. e. Robinson, 42 B.T.A. 725 (1940).
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corporation reacquires shares, the important question is whether the
reacquisition is essentially equivalent to a dividend. It was inevitable that
the courts would become tangled in a hopeless web of technicalities once
they started asking whether a given reacquisition was a Hsale" or a "re_
demption." The language of section US(g) did not compel the courts
to make this artificial distinction. Certainly Hredemption" is a term broad
enough to cover reacquisitions which do not involve formal cancellation
of shares. Even if the shares were sold to the corporation, there was no
reason why the "sale" could not also have been, from the point of view of
the corporation, a "redemption." The courts, and not Congress, chose to
equate "redemption" and "cancellation."
It is difficult to understand what factors courts actually considered in
these cases. Before 1942, a partial liquidation received short-term capital
gain treatment.11 It may be that the courts were seeking a way to avoid
this harsh treatment. They may have been impressed with the idea that
a transfer of stock by a shareholder to his corporation was similar to a
transfer of the stock to another shareholder. If the transactions resembled
"sales," courts were willing to impose a long-term capital gains ta-x
instead of the short-term tax which followed from the partial1iquidations
treatment of the Code.'8
But it is even more difficult to understand why these cases were decided
in such great numbers. Throughout the 1930's and early 1940's, when
the bulk of these decisions were handed down, section U5Cg) was in
the Code. It provided that a cancellation or redemption essentially equiva-
lent to a dividend would be taxed as a dividend. And courts were deciding
regularly under section 115 (g) that a reacquisition was or was not essen-
tially equivalent to a dividend, disregarding completely whether the cor-
poration had retired the shares or held them in the treasury.111 A long
line of Tax Court and Circuit Court cases indicates that in deciding ques-
tions under section 115(g) there was no concern for the formal way in
which the shares were treated on the corporate books.sO A full discussion
and criticism of the criteria used by courts in section 115(g) cases will
follow. But at least the courts in deciding cases under section 115 (g)
77 See note 57 supra.
78 See Conan Trust Y. Comm'r, 2 TCM 703 (1943). There the Ta." Court stated
that section 115(c), which at that time ta.xed partial liquidations as short-term capital
gains, was designed to prevent concealed dividends. The Court called the transaction a
"sale" because it did not resemble a dividend. The feeling that section 115(c), before
its amendment in 1942, was designed to punish concealed dividends undoubted\)' led to
the labelling of many redemptions as "sales."
79 E.g., Robinson v. Comm'r, 69 F.2d 972 (C.C.A.5th 1934) ; E. M. Peet, 43 B. T. A.
852 (1941); J. Natwick, 36 B.T.A. 866 (1937).
80 Of the many tests established by courts in deciding cases under section USCg),
see p. 465 infra, none had anything to do with the bookkeeping entries made b)' the
corporation.
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were addressing themselves to the important question underlying all reac-
quisitions of corporate stock-is it essentially equivalent to a dividend?
Why was it, then, that with section llS(g) in the Code, so many skir-
mishes were fought along the line of "sale" versus "partial liquidation"?
The answer is not explicit in any of the cases. Undoubtedly many
courts, like the Second Circuit, felt that "redemption and cancellation"
could not include treasury shares.81 Courts may have felt that the statute
called for an analysis of the way the corporation treated the shares.52
Also, as long as section 11 S(c) provided for short-term capital gains
treatment for partial liquidations, there was less initiative for the Treasury
to prove that a particular distribution was "essentially equivalent" to a
dividend under section 115 (g). It is true that in a partial liquidation the
taxpayer could still offset his basis, while under section lIS (g) he could
not, if there were post-1913 earnings and profits.83 Nevertheless, the
taxation of the gain in full under section 115 (c) may have lessened the
zeal of the Treasury to prove a case under section llS(g).
But perhaps the explanation for the tendency of the Treasury and the
courts to discuss the problem in terms of "sale" and "partial liquidation"
rather than in terms suggested by the language of section 115 (g), lies in
the history of section l1S(g) itself, which is discussed more fully below.
It is sufficient here to indicate that the prototype of section 115(g) was
enacted to prevent the redemption of tax-free stock dividends.84 Thus,
most of the cases under section l1S(g) have involved the redemption of
shares that had been issued as a stock dividend. On the other hand, the
"sale" and "partial liquidation" cases, for the most part, involved shares
that had not been issued as stock dividends. Although section 115 (g) is
not limited to the redemption of shares originally issued as dividend
shares,85 there may have been a reluctance on the part of the courts and
even of the Treasury to invoke the section in situations where the shares
were acquired for value rather than as dividends.
81 Alpers v. Comm'r, 126 F2d 58 (C.e.A2d 1942).
82 Hamilton Allport, 4 T.e. 401, 403 (1944): " ..• the statute applies not to a dis-
tribution in liquidation of the corporation or its business but to a distribution in cancella-
tion or redemption of part of its stock." Cited in John M. Hathaway, 4 TCM 646 (1945).
83 When a distribution is taxed under section 115(g), the taxpayer cannot offset his
basis. Undoubtedly, the fear that this basis might be permanently lost to the taxpayer
has led courts to express concern for the purchaser for value who may forever lose his
original investment. S~e p. 478 infra. The devices employed by taxpayers and courts to
regain this basis are beyond the scope of this article. A good recent discussion of the
problem is contained in Katcher, The Case of the Forgotten Basis: Al~ Adlllollitioll to
Victims of Intemol RevCIllle Code Section 115(g), 48 MICH. L. REV. 465 (1950).
84 See notes 97 and 102 illfra.
85 Section 115(g) states, "If a corporation cancels or redeems its stock (whether or
not such stock was issued as a stock dividend..•. "
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Whatever reasons may have impelled the courts to draw a formalistic
distinction between "sales" and "partial liquidations," one of the differ-
ences which was engendered by this distinction was eliminated in 1942.
Thereafter, gains resulting from distributions in partial liquidation quali-
fied as long-term capital gains if the surrendered shares had been held
for more than six months.80 Thus, a partial liquidation was taxed at the
same rate as a sale.
This did not mean, however, that the distinction between sales and
partial liquidations had completely lost its importance. The distinction
still lives and may result in serious ta.x differences,8: the most important
being the application of section 115 (g). That section, it will be remem-
bered, can be applied only if there has been a partial liquidation, i.e., a
cancellation or redemption. The Ta.x Court, and most courts of appeals,
in applying section 115 (g), have rarely turned their decisions on the
question of "sale" and "partial liquidation." They have tacitly assumed
that section 115(g) could be invoked even if the shares were not per-
manently retired. But the Second Circurit has consistently maintained
that, since section 115 (g) comes into play only if there has been a partial
liquidation, it cannot be invoked if the transaction is a sale.8s In Kirschell-
baum v. Commissioner,89 decided in 1946, the Second Circuit reiterated
that in cases which come through the district court, the distinction between
sale and partial liquidation would be applied. If the reacquired shares are
held as treasury shares, the Second Circuit will refuse to apply section
115(g). It is significant that only the Dobson 00 rule prevented the
86 Revenue Act of 1942, Sec. 147, 56 STAT. 841 (1942) (amclldillg loR-C. §1l5(c».
87 The distinction between "sale" and "partial liquidation" may havc ta.__ consequences
to the corporation as well as to the stockholder. Rcg. 111, 29.22(a)-20, for instance, pro-
vides: "No gain or loss is realized by a corporation from the merc distribution of its
assets in kind in partial or complete liquidation, howcvcr they may have appreciated
or depreciated in value since their acquisition." Thus, if a corporation distributes appre-
ciated assets, the favorable effects to the taxpayer of a "salc" arc mitigated by the ta.__
which the corporation must pay because it has realized a gain from the "salc" of the
asset to the stockholder. See Lucius Pitkin, 13 T.C. No. 72 (1949).
Reg. 111, 29.22(a)-15 provides another examplc of thc distinction for ta.__ purposes
between "sales" and "partial liquidations." It states: " ... if thc corporation receives
its own stock as consideration upon the sale of property by it ••• the gain or loss result-
ing is to be computed in the same manner as though thc payment had been made in an)'
other property." Clearly, a distribution in partial liquidation would not fall within this
provision and the corporation is not ta.xed for any gain or loss which results from a
difference between the basis of the property and the markct value of the stock.
88 E.g., Alpers v. Comm'r, 126 F.2d 58 (C.C.A.2d 1942).
89 155 F.2d 23 (C.C.A.2d 1946).
90 Dobson v. Comm'r, 320 U.S. 489, 501 (1943): "Congress has invcsted the Ta."
Court with primary authority for redetermining deficiencies, which constitutes the greater
part of tax litigation . . . ; when the court cannot scparatc tile clements of a decision
so as to identify a clear-cut mistake of law, the dccision of tile Ta." Court must stand."
See note 91 illfra.
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Second Circuit from overruling the Tax Court's determination that sec-
tion 115 (g) should apply even though the shares were held in the cor-
porate treasury. The legislative overruling 01 of the Dobson rule might
eliminate the restraints which prevented the Second Circuit from substi-
tuting its judgment for that of the Tax Court. Furthermore, a recent
Seventh Circuit case, Commissioner v. Snite,02 indicates that another
Circuit might hold section 115 (g) inapplicable if the reacquisition is
considered a "sale." In that case the Circuit Court upheld the Tax Court's
ruling that the distribution was not essentially equivalent to a dividend
under section 115(g). In dicta, however, the Court cited Alpers v. Com-
missioner and stated that in its opinion Snite had received the proceeds
of a sale. The implication was very strong that if the Tax Court had held
this to be a dividend under section 115 (g), the Seventh Circuit might
have reversed on grounds that a redemption had not occurred.
It has generally been assumed that if a reacquisition is a sale rather
than a partial liquidation, capital gains treatment would inevitably follow.
Certainly the statute does not lead inexorably to this conclusion. Section
115 (a) lays down the general rule that all distributions out of earnings
and profits are dividends. Section 115 (c) provides an exception to this
rule for complete and partial liquidations. A strong argument can be
maintained that liquidations provide the only exception to the rule of
section 115 (a) . Therefore, if the earnings are not distributed in com-
plete or partial liquidation, as defined by the statute, section 115 (a) should
apply and the earnings should be taxed as ordinary dividends. A transfer
of cash or property to the stockholder, that is, can be regarded as a "dis-
tribution" under section 115 (a) even though the stockholder surrenders
his stock. There is one precedent for this conclusion, James D. Robillson
v. Commissioner/3 decided by the Fifth Circuit in 1934. That case in-
volved a simultaneous stock dividend and reacquisition by the corporation.
The stockholder argued that he had received the proceeds of a "sale,"
making section 115(g) inapplicable. The Court held that even if section
115(g) did not cover the case, there had been a clear distribution of
earnings and profits which could be taxed as a dividend. In 1945, in the
case of Upham v. Commissioner,04 the Government tried to run a similar
argument. But there the Tax Court rejected the Government's contention
that, because the transaction was a sale, it should be decided under $ection
91 LR.e. §1l41 (a) became law on September 1, 1948. It provides, "The Circuit Courts
of Appeals ... shall have exclusive jurisdiction to review the decisions of the Tax
Court ... in the same manner and to the same extent as decisions of the district courts
in civil actions tried without a jury."
02 177 F.2d 819 (e.C.A.7th 1949).
93 69 F.2d 972 (e.C.A.5th 1934).
944 T.e. 1120 (1945). See also Comm'r v. Quackenbos, 78 F.2d 156 (C.C.A.2d 1935).
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115(a). Instead the Court ruled that the distribution was a liquidation
under section 115(c) and not essentially equivalent to a dividend under
section 115(g). It may be that a future court might follow the Robinson
case and hold that "sales" of stock to the corporation which result in the
distribution of earnings are ta.xable to the e.'dent of post-1913 earnings
and profits.
This conclusion, of course, would not solve the basic problem which
causes the confusion in the "sale" and "partial liquidation" cases. The
issue would still tum on a formalistic distinction. 'Whereas now a verdict
of "sale" results in an automatic capital gains treatment, an eA-tension
of the Robinson holding would find ta......-payers fleeing from the category
that had formerly been a haven. The label "dividend" would be stamped
on every distribution except a partial liquidation. The ta......-payer would be
forced to steer a narrow course: the distribution must be partial liquida-
tion but at the same time not a distribution essentially equivalent to a
dividend under section 115(g).
Although the problem of distinguishing between sales and partial
liquidations is still with us, the Act of 1942 had the salutary effect of
lessening the tax consequences which result from the distinction. Conse-
quently, the battleground in recent years has shifted almost entirely to
section 115 (g). The Treasury is no longer content to prove only that a
partial liquidation has taken place. Instead, it often contends that there
has been a partial liquidation essentially equivalent to a dividend. Thus,
the interpretation of section 115 (g) is today the most important factor
in the taxation of corporate liquidations. It is to this section that we now
tum.
Section 115(g)-Esselltially Equivalent to a Dic.tidelld. The legislative
history of section 115 (g) has been related often and in great detaiPS
It will be briefly repeated here, but only to the e.xtent that it has influenced
subsequent interpretation. "Then the Supreme Court, in 1920, held that
Congress could not constitutionally ta.x stock dividends,oo it became appar-
ent at once that the decision could be used by stockholders as a device
for avoiding the personal income ta.x on cash dividends. A corporation
could issue a tax-free stock dividend and tllen redeem these shares at
95 See e.g., Gutkin & Beck, Stock Redemptions as Taxable Et'cnts tinder Section 115(g):
The I1IIpressionistic Test, 80 J. Accountancy 285, 286 (1945); Darrell, Corporate Liquida-
tions and tTte Federal Incollle Tar, 89 U. OF PA. L. REv. 907, 910 ff. (1941). For general
discussions of the interpretation of section U5(g), sec Adams, SOllie Tar Aspects of
Complete and Partial Liquidations of Corporations, 28 N. C. L. RE\'. 36 (1949); Gor-
mick, "§115(g)," 78 J. Accountancy 60, 61 (1944); Danzig, Distributions in Liquidatior,s
and Reorganizations-Their Tax Consequences, 26 TAXES 645 (1948); Murph}', Partial
Liquidations and tTte NtrdJ Look, 5 TA."" L. REv. 73 (1949).
96 Eisner v. :Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
Imaged with the Permission ofN.Y.U. Tax Law Review
HeinOnline -- 5 Tax L. Rev. 466 1949-1950
466 TAX LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5:
their fair market value. The proceeds of liquidation would be taxed only
to the extent that they exceeded the basis allocated to the dividend shares
and then only as capital gains. The stockholder could recover the basis
of the dividend shares tax-free. This possibility led to section 201 (d) 01
of the Act of 1921, taxing redemptions of stock dividends if the redemp~
tion was essentially equivalent to a dividend. This was changed in 1924
to include cases where stock was redeemed first, and then replaced by a
stock dividend.9s And, finally, in 1926 the section was given its present
form,99 being applicable "whether or not [cancelled or redeemedJ stock
was issued as a stock dividend," if the distribution is a dividend in dis~
guise. As already indicated, the section was not of major importance
until 1942, because partial liquidations were treated like short-term capital
transactions. In 1942, however, the section attained new importance when
Congress permitted distributions in partial liquidation to qualify for long-
term capital gains treatment.100 The House Report specifically stated that
section 115 (g) was to be relied on to check abuses of the newly-given
benefit to partial liquidations.lol
But section 115 (g) has had a difficult time cutting the umbilical cord
connecting it with Eisner v. Macomber. It has already been indicated that
the Treasury and the courts have been reluctant to apply the section if the
redeemed shares had not been issued as tax-free stock dividends. But the
history of section 115(g) has had another and more damaging effect on
its subsequent interpretation. Since the section was introduced to strike
at the redemption of shares which were originally issued for the purpose
of avoiding personal income taxes,102 many courts have hesitated to
invoke the section if the shares were originally issued free of such un~
savory motives.loa The Second Circuit, in Patty v. H elverillg/04 went
so far as to say that if the shares were originally issued in good faith,
section 115 (g) could never apply. 'While other courts did not take so
extreme a position, the purpose behind the original issuance of the shares
was frequently mentioned as a factor in deciding whether a distribution
01 Revenue Act of 1921, Sec. 201 (d), 42 STAT. 228 (1921).
os Revenue Act of 1924, Sec. 201 (f), 43 STAT. 255 (1924).
99 Revenue Act of 1926, Sec. 20l(g), 44 STAT. 11 (1926).
100 See note 56 supra.
101 See note 58 supra.
102 The wording of the original section 201 (d) of the Act of 1921 is aimed explicitly
at the redemption of dividend shares (42 STAT. 228 (1921». See Note, Stock Rcdcmptioll
of CallcellatiOl~ Taxable as Dividelld, 49 HARV. L. REv. 1344 (1936).
loa E.g., Comm'r v. Cordingley, 78 F2d 118 (C.C.A.lst 1935) ; Comm'r v. Quackenbos,
78 F.2d 156 (C.C.A.2d 1935); Comm'r v. Babson, 70 F.2d 304 (C.C.A.7th 1934):
George A. Lembcke, 33 RT.A. 700 (1935).
104 98 F.2d 717 (C.C.A.3d 1938).
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was to be taxed as a dividend under section 115(g).m It was this type
of reasoning that led courts to use the "continuing plan" criterion of
taxability, a criterion not wholly dead.
Courts looked for a continuing plan, dating from the time the shares
were issued, to use the shares as a cloak for the distribution of dividends
through a subsequent redemption.10o Although the statute requires only
that the cancellation or redemptim~ be essentially equivalent to a dividend,
courts often insisted upon a direct relationship between the issuance and
the redemption. Apart from the invalidity of this "continuing plan"
test in terms of the wording of section 115 (g), the criteria used by the
courts to determine the good faith of the original issuance were com-
pletely unrealistic. If a corporation could show that business had e.,,-
panded or was going to eA-pand, necessitating more capital, courts apply-
ing the "continuing" plan test would usually be convinced that the shares
had been issued for a valid business purpose.107 Almost entirely over-
looked in this analysis were the economic realities of the particular case.
When a small closely-held corporation wishes to reinvest its earnings,
it does not have to issue a stock dividend to do it. Admittedly, a stock
dividend, by freezing surplus into capital, might make the corporation
a safer credit risk, but only rarely did the courts mention this factor.1o!l
In judging the bona fides of the original issuance, courts usually asked
only whether the business was eA-p,,:nding. This type of analysis had little
meaning when applied to the stock dividends of a closely-held corporation.
This analysis is even more sterile if the shares were not issued as a
stock dividend. Rarely can it be shown that shares which were issued for
consideration were to be used in a "continuing plan" of distributing earn-
ings and profits. If this were the sole test for the imposition of a tax
under section 115 (g), the 1926 amendment, which sought to broaden
its application to cover shares "whether or not . . . issued as a stock
dividend," would be a dead letter.
Fortunately, however, most courts at an early stage rejected the view
that the original issue of the shares was the key factor to be considered
105 E.g., De Nobili Cigar Co. v. Comm'r, 143 F.2d 436 (C.C.A.2d 1944); Albert T.
Perkins, 36 B.T.A. 791 (1937). See also cases cited note 103 supra.
106 Comm'r v. Rockwood, 83 F.2d 359 (C.C.A.7th 1936); H. F. Asmussen, 36 B.T.A.
878 (1937); Alfred E. Fuhlage, 32 B.T.A. 27.2 (1935); Heber Scowcraft Invcstment Co.,
4 TCM: 755 (1945). A slight variation on this "continuing plan" theme is the tendency
of some courts to apply section U5(g) if therc is a short timc interval between the
issuance and redemption of the shares. Shelby H. Curlee, 28 B.T.A. 773 (1933), aff'd,
Randolph v. Comm'r, 76 F.2d 472 (C.C.A.8th 1935).
107 Heber Scowcraft Investment Co., 4 TCM: 755 (1945) ; Alfred E. Fuh13ge, 32 B.T.A.
222 (1935).
108 George A. Lembcke, 33 B.T.A. 700 (1935).
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in analyzing the subsequent redemption.109 Courts using the "continuing
plan" test often used other criteria which served to outweigh the fact
that the shares may have been issued for a bona fide business purpose.110
And in Kirschenbaum v. Commissioner,111 the Second Circuit declared
that the Supreme Court, by its decision in Bedford v. Commissioner,m
had overruled the position that section 115(g) could never apply if the
shares were issued for a valid business purpose.
Most courts have looked to the circumstances surrounding the reacquisi-
tion of the shares. And they have repeated with almost monotonous regu-
larity that the facts of each case must determine the result. But in analyz-
ing the facts of each case, different courts have looked for different things.
The law under section 115 (g) is still uncertain.
On the verbal level most courts agree that the intent of the corporation
in redeeming the shares is not a controlling factor. 113 Certainly if the
court can find an intent to avoid taxes, i.e., a distribution cloaked as a
partial liquidation in order to avoid being treated as a dividend, this will
weigh heavily in the decision that a section 115(g) dividend has occurred.
But it is settled that the absence of such an intent on the part of the cor-
poration will not assure the stockholders of freedom from liability under
section 115 (g) .114 The "net effect" of the redemption, rather than the
good faith of the corporation, has supposedly been the key factor. 11o
But what individual facts must be accumulated before the "net effect"
adds up to a distribution that is essentially equivalent to a dividend?
Courts have provided stockholders with a number of criteria. Some offer
genuine assistance in determining whether the transaction resembles the
type of distribution which is taxable as a dividend under section 115(a).
Unfortunately, however, the most important single standard of taxability
under section 115 (g), the existence of a legitimate business purpose, has
little to do with the existence of a "dividend" as the term is defined by
section 115 (a) . In the final analysis, it will be seen that, although the
courts claim they are looking to the "net effect," they have been using
109 E.g., Smith v. United States, 121 F2d 692 (C.C.A.3d 1941) ; Hyman v. Hclvcring,
71 F.2d 342 (App. D. C. 1934); E. M. Peet, 43 B.T.A. 852 (1941); William H.
Grimditch, 37 B.T.A. 402 (1938).
110 Courts, while not rejecting completely the test of bona fide issuance of the shares,
have frequently stated that it is only one of several factors to be considered. Hill v.
~omm'r, 66 F.2d 45 (C.C.AAth 1933); A. E. Levit, 43 B.T.A. 1077 (1941), appeal
dismissed sub 110111. Clayburgh v. Comm'r, 122 F.2d 411 (C.C.A.9th 1941).
111155 F.2d 23 (C.C.A.2d 1946).
112 325 U.S. 283 (1945).
113 E.g., Hirsch v. Comm'r, 124 F2d 24 (C.C.A.9th 1941).
114 Ibid.; William H. Grimditch, 37 B.T.A. 402 (1938).
115 Smith v. United States, 121 F2d 692 (C.C.A.3d 1941); Flanagan v. Helvering,
116 F.2d 937 (App. D. C. 1940) ; Fostoria Glass Co. v. Yoke, 45 F. Supp. 962 (N. D.
W. Va. 1942).
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to an increasing e>..1:ent a standard of legitimate business purpose which
has little to do with the distribution's net effect.
A constant factor considered by the courts is the c.-.-tent to which the
distribution is prorated among the various stockholders.no There is no
doubt that a pro rata distribution will raise a presumption that there has
been a distribution essentially equivalent to a dividend. But a legitimate
corporate purpose for the distribution can usually obviate the effects of
the pro rata distribution.117 Conversely, tlle absence of a pro rata distribu-
tion does not necessarily eliminate the possibility of a tax under section
115 (g). Some courts have recognized that even a non-pro rata distribu-
tion can be essentially equivalent to a dividend if it has not resulted in
a substantial change in the proportionate ownership equity of the individual
stockholder,118 or if it appears that the distribution does not reflect a
contraction in the activities of the corporation.11o
The corporation's past dividend record is sometimes considered, but
courts have drawn neatly opposing inferences from the record. Most
courts are ready to find that a corporation with a poor dividend record
which suddenly redeems its shares with earnings and profits is really
concealing a dividend.12O But the Ta.-.- Court has recently held that a poor
dividend record indicated a valid redemption, since a substantial dividend
would have represented a sharp departure from past policy.m
Courts have also sought to place responsibility for initiating the dis-
tribution, apparently in the belief that a distribution instigated by share-
holders is more like a dividend than one arising from the spontaneous
action of the board of directors.1:!:! It is also apparently thought that a
distribution instigated by stockholders may be one which does not serve
the legitimate ends of the corporation.1:!3 This effort to fix responsibility
116 Flanagan v. He1vering, 116 F.2d 937 (App. D. C. 1940) ; Brown v. Comm'r, 79 F.2d
73 (C.C.A.3d 1935); Hill v. Comm'r, 66 F.2d 45 (e.C.A.4th 1933); R. W. Creech.
46 B.T.A. 93 (1942); c/., Fred B. Snite, 10 T.e. 523 (1948); Clara Louise Flinn, 37
B.T.A. 1085 (1938); H. F. Asmussen, 36 B.T.A. 878 (1937).
111 Comm'r v. Champion, 78 F.2d 513 (e.e.A.6th 1935); Samuel A. Upham, 4 T.e.
1120 (1945); John P. Elton, 47 B.T.A. 111 (1942); Edwin L. Jones, B.T.A. Memo.
Dkt. 106135. P-H lf42,555 (1942).
118 Hirsch v. Comm'r, 124 F.2d 24 (e.e.A.9th 1941); J. Natwick, 36 B.T.A. 866
(1937). See Pullman, Inc., 8 T.C. 292 (1947) (petitioner holding 99 per cent of shares
ta.-..:ed under section 115(g».
119 Hirsch v. Comm'r, 124 F.2d 24 (C.e.A.9th 1941) ; William W. Wood, 2 TCM 1010
(1943).
120 E.g., Goldstein v. Comm'r, 113 F.2d 363 (e.C.A.7th 1940) ; E. M. Peet. 43 B.T.A.
852 (1941); c/., Fred B. Snite, 10 T.C. 523 (1948), aff'd, 177 F.2d 819 (e.C.A.7th 1949).
121 Joseph W. Imler, 11 T.C. 836 (1948).
122 Flanagan v. He1vering, 116 F.2d 937 (App. D. C. 1940).
123 Smith v. United States, 121 F.2d 692 (C.C.A.3d 1941); A. E. Levit. 43 B.T.A.
1077 (1941), appeal dismissed sub "om. Clayburgh v. Comm'r, 122 Fold 411 (C.C.A.9th
1941).
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is quixotic; the shareholders of the typical small or medium-sized cor-
poration cannot be divorced from the board of directors, and in the case
of a publicly-held corporation with a self-perpetuating board, the "initia-
tive" of a shareholder would not result in a distribution unless the board
for its own reasons agreed. As in the case of a distribution of earnings
and profits without a surrender of shares, a distribution in cancellation
or redemption of shares can occur for a variety of reasons. But whether
the reason is good, bad, or indifferent cannot be ascertained by asking
whether it came from the directors or their masters.
The most important single factor, however, in the interpretation of
section 115 (g) has been the test of "legitimate business purpos('.'· 124
One would think that a redemption involving a pro rata distribution of
earnings and profits by a corporation with a poor dividend record and
occurring at the initiative of the stockholders would result in a taxable
dividend. Yet courts will probably say "no dividend under section
115(g)," if they find that the redemption or cancellation was for a
"legitimate business purpose." Of course, the existence of a business pur-
pose has nothing at all to do with the net economic effect of the trans-
action. To employ the business purpose test involves sneaking in an intent
factor despite frequent protestations that intent is immaterial. Some
courts have recognized the conflict between the "net effect" standard and
the standard of legitimate business purpose.m But Smith v. United
States,126 a Supreme Court case decided in 1941, is more typical. There
the Court insisted that the key to the question of taxability under section
115 (g) was the "net effect" of the transaction. But one of the strongest
reasons given by the Court in imposing a tax under section 115 (g) was
the absence of a justifiable business reason for the redemption. Once
a court looks for justifiable business reasons, it is forgetting about the
net economic effect of the transaction. The net effect will be the same
regardless of the reasons which impelled the distribution.
124 The cases which have used the business purpose test are legion. The following have
imposed a tax under section 115(g) because of a lack of legitimate purpose: Flanagan v.
Helvering, 116 F.2d 937 (App. D. C 1940) ; Goldstein v. Comm'r, 113 F2d 363 (C.C.A.7th
1940); Brown v. Comm'r, 79 F.2d 73 (C.C.A.3d 1935) j Fostoria Glass Co. v. Yoke,
45 F. Supp. 962 (N. D. W. Va. (1942); A. E. Levit, 43 B.T.A. 1077 (1941), appeal
dismissed sub 110111. Clayburgh v. Comm'r, 122 F.2d 411 (C.CA.9th 1941) j Pullman,
Inc., 8 T.C. 292 (1947).
The following cases have refused to impose a section 115 (g) tax because of the existence
of a legitimate business purpose: Comm'r v. Champion, 78 F.2d 513 (C.C.A.6th 1935) j
Comm'r v. Babson, 70 F.2d (C.CA.7th 1934); L. M. Lockhart, 8 T.C. 436 (1947) j
Samuel A. Upham, 4 T.C 1120 (1945); Bona Allen, Jr., 41 B.T.A. 206 (1940); H. F.
Asmussen, 36 B.T.A. 878 (1937) j Albert T. Perkins, 36 B.T.A. 791 (1937).
125 E.g., William H. Grimditch, 37 B.T.A. 402 (1938).
126 121 F.2d 692 (CCA.3d 1941).
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Courts have approved a variety of fact-situations as constituting a
valid business purpose under section USCg). In Lockhart 'l Co111mis-
simler 127 the Tax Court justified the transfer of assets to stockholders
in exchange for most of the stock, on the ground that the business could
operate better as a single proprietorship than as a corporation. The trans-
fer of stock to the corporation for purpose of resale to junior e.xecutivcs
is another valid purpose,128 although in closely-held corporations it would
appear that this could be as easily accomplished by authorizing the issuance
of new shares. A valid business purpose has been found when share-
holders surrender stock in exchange for cancellation of debts which they
owe to the corporation.129 And the test was satisfied when the shares were
reacquired in order to provide a profitable form of investment for an
employees' association.1ao
But the most frequent escape from section 115 (g) has been a showing
that the distribution of assets reflects a contraction or "legitimate shrink-
age" in the corporation's business activities.l3l This does not mean that
all courts have turned cases on the question of legitimate contraction
of the business or have even used the business purpose test. Many dis-
tributions have been taxed under section l1S(g) without even a mention
of business purpose.132 But in those cases which have relied on the busi-
ness purpose test in the interpretation of section l1S(g), business pur-
pose has been equated with a legitimate shrinkage of corporate activity.l33
Such a restriction on the applicability of section 115 (g) cannot be found
in the statute itself. It derives undoubtedly from the economic definition
of a partial liquidation.
What, in economic terms, have courts considered legitimate shrinkages
of business activity? A redemption of stock following reduction in opera-
tions caused by a fire which permanently destroyed the two top floors of
a building has escaped the pinch of section 115 (g).1St The discontinuance
127 8 T.C. 436 (1947).
128 Fred B. Snite, 10 T.C. 523 (1948), aff'd, 177 F.2d 819 (CCA.7th 1949) ; Bernard R.
Armour, B.T.A. Memo. Dkt. 106256. P-H U42,446 (1942).
129 Bona Allen, Jr., 41 B.T.A.206 (1940).
130 H. F. Asmussen, 36 RT.A. 878 (1937).
131 Comm'r v. Champion, 78 F.2d 513 (C.C.A.6th 1935); Comm'r v. Babson, 70 F.2d
304 (e.C.A.7th 1934) ; Joseph W. Imler, 11 T.C. 836 (1948); Samuel A. Upham, 4 T.C
1120 (1945); Albert T. Perkins, 36 B.T.A. 791 (1937); Heber Scowcra£t Investment Co.,
4 TCM 755 (1945); cf., Rheinstrom v. Comm'r, 125 F.2d 790 (e.CA.6th 1942); Bro\':n .....
Comm'r, 79 F.2d 73 (CC.A.3d 1935); Flanagan v. He1vering, 116 F.2d 937 (App. D. C.
1940) ; Stein v. United States, 62 F. Supp. 568 (Ct. O. 1945) ; William W. Wood, 2 TCM
1010 (1943).
132 Hyman v. Helvering, 71 F.2d 342 (App. D. C. 1934); Hill v. Comm'r, 65 F.2d 45
(C.C.A.4th 1933) ; E. M. Peet, 43 B.T.A. 852 (1941).
133 See cases cited note 131 slIpra.
134 Joseph W. Imler, 11 T.C. 836 (1948).
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of several unprofitable departments has been held a legitimate shrinkage
even though the net sales of the corporation were increasing at the time.13O
The most common example of legitimate shrinkage occurs when business
conditions have caused a decline in sales. At such times corporate directors
conclude that the business is "over-capitalized" and vote to redeem shares.
If a corporation can show such a contraction of business activity, the
chances are excellent that the "legitimate shrinkage" test will permit an
escape from the tax rigors of section 115(g).136
Even if one assumes that a "business purpose" test has a proper place
in the interpretation of section 115 (g), it is highly questionable that the
standard of "legitimate shrinkage" has any economic validity. Courts are
impressed with the discontinuance of a part of the business.137 But what
if we have a business which has accumulated a surplus in expectation of
an expansion which, for some reason, never occurs? When this COrpora-
tion distributes the surplus, the stockholders probably will not be pro-
tected by the shield of legitimate shrinkage.188 But in both cases the
economic decision made by the directors was essentially the same. They
decided that capital was no longer required for the needs of the business
and could be distributed among the stockholders through a redemption of
capital stock. In one instance the capital had been used for an activity
that was being curtailed. In the other, it was capital that had been saved
for an activity which never took place. It is hard to understand why one
distribution represents a more "legitimate shrinkage" than the other or
exhibits a more valid business purpose.
And the "legitimate shrinkage" concept becomes mOre meaningless
when viewed as a standard of taxation under section 115(g). That
section is concerned with taxing distributions that are "essentially equiva-
lent" to dividends. No stockholder can escape paying a tax under section
115 (a), the section which defines dividends, because the distribution rep-
resented a "legitimate shrinkage" of the corporation's activities. A dis-
tribution is a dividend under section 115 (a) when earnings and profits
are separated from the corporation and distributed to shareholders without
altering their relative ownership interests. If the same result is achieved
as a result of a redemption of stock, it should be taxed as a dividend.
Obviously, if we are looking to see whether there has been a distribution
of assets without a change in proportionate ownership, it is immaterial
135 Heber Scowcraft Investment Co. v. Comm'r, 4 TCM 755 (1945).
136 Samuel A. Upham, 4 Toe. 1120 (1945); Albert T. Perkins, 36 B.T.A. 791 (1937);
Edwin L. Jones, B.T.A. Memo. Dkt. 106135. P-H lf42,555 (1942).
131 See cases cited notes 134, 135, and 136 supra.
188 McGuire Vo Comm'r, 84 Fo2d 431 (C.C.A.7th 1936) (distribution taxed despite
stockholder's argument that the money had been saved for an expansion program thilt
never occurred).
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whether the distribution was caused by a legitimate shrinkage or by boom-
year profits.
It is not contended here that every distribution out of earnings and
profits should be taxed under section 115(g). There are factors, to be
discussed below, which may distinguish some redemptions or cancellations
from ordinary dividends, and when these factors are present, the distribu-
tion should receive the benefits of capital gains treatment as provided in
section 115(c). But a legitimate shrinkage of business activity is not one
of these factors. In a sense there is a shrinkage of activity every time a
dividend is paid. There will be that much less capital with which to
operate the business. Even so, section 115(a) imposes a ta."i:. If I&legiti-
mate shrinkage" is not a factor under section 115 (a), there is no reason
to introduce it as a factor in section 115(g), since we must inevitably
look to section 115 (a) in order to determine whether a distribution is
"essentially equivalent to a dividend."
The same can be said of the tests which look to past dividend records
or try to locate the initiative for the distribution. Stockholders in a
corporation with a spectacular record of dividends will be ta."i:ed under
section 115(a) if the corporation adds another dividend to this excellent
record. 'iVhy should stockholders of another corporation with an equally
excellent record escape a tax under section 115(g) merely because the
distribution of earnings and profits is by way of a redemption? Nor does
the net effect of a distribution resemble a dividend any less because it
happens to have been instigated by the stockholders, if indeed they can
be realistically separated from the directors. Section 115(g) aims at
distributions in partial liquidation which have the effect of dividends.
It is absurd to select a characteristic of the liquidating distributon, which
is equally present in many dividends, and use it to prove that the liquidat-
ing distribution is not "essentially equivalent" to a dividend. Yet precisely
this is done by the emphasis on "legitimate shrinkage," directorial initia-
tive, and dividend history. •
The Search for Order. The problem in partial liquidations is with us
in part because Congress has chosen to make a broad e."i:ception to the rule
that all distributions of earnings and profits are dividends. It is also with
us because of the capital gains treatment which Congress allows for the
sale of stock by one shareholder to another. As a result of these two
factors, a certain amount of earnings and profits can be distributed to
stockholders without subjecting the recipient to the personal income ta."i:
normally attendant on dividends. 'iVhen a stockholder transfers his stock
to a corporation under conditions which resemble a transfer to a willing
individual purchaser, courts tend quite naturally to treat the transactions
alike. This results in a loophole through which might pass, unless checked,
Imaged with the Permission ofN.Y.U. Tax Law Review
HeinOnline -- 5 Tax L. Rev. 474 1949-1950
474 TAX LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5:
a variety of distributions which should be subjected to taxation as
dividends.
The first principle to be applied in analyzing the reacquisition of shares
is the principle which Congress so wisely laid down in section 11S(g).
All reacquisitions of stock should be made to run the gauntlet which that
section established-is it essentially equivalent to a dividend? No reacqui~
sition should escape this test merely because it bears the label of Hsale."
The present language of section 115 (g) is sufficiently broad to include
all reacquisitions; all should be subjected to the test which that section
Imposes.
But how to find a rational interpretation of section 115 (g)? One easy
solution was suggested by the Second Circuit when it decided Kirschen-
baum v. Commissioner.139 There the Court posed the possibility that
section 115 (g) was designed to tax as a dividend all earnings and profits
distributed in cancellation or redemption of stock. The suggestion was
based on the Supreme Court's decision in Commissioner v. Bedford/40
though that case was decided under section 112(c) (2) rather than under
section 115 (g). Petitioner in the Bedford case exchanged 3000 shares
of preferred for 3S00 shares of preferred, 1S00 shares of common
and $45,240 in cash. The cash was considered Hboot" under section
112(c) (1), to be taxed as a capital gain unless, under section 112(c) (2),
it Hhad the effect of the distribution of a taxable dividend." Justice Frank-
furter, speaking for a unanimous Court, held that the distribution of
earnings and profits in a reorganization has the effect of a taxable dividend
under section 112(c) (2). The Kirschenbaum case, on the other hand,
involved a pro rata reacquisition of one-third of the outstanding shares
for cash at a time when the accumulated earnings and profits of the cor-
poration were greater than the cash distributed. The narrow holding of
the Kirschenbaum case was that the appellate court would not reverse
the Tax Court's findings that the distribution was taxable under section
11S(g). The Court then went on to say that Bedford had Hauthori-
tatively overruled" the earlier Second Circuit decisions which had refused
to apply section 115(g) if the shares were originally issued for a bona
fide business purpose. This was a thoroughly desirable conclusion even
though it has no apparent basis in the Bedford case. The Court in the
Kirschenbaum case then suggested, H... perhaps the section [11S(g)]
covers all cancellations or redemptions which result in the distribution of
accumulated earnings." 141
139 155 F.2d 23 (C.C.A.2d 1946). See Note, 20 So. CALIF. L. REV. 379 (1947).
140 325 U.S. 283 (1945).
141 155 F.2d 23, 24 (C.C.A.2d 1946). See Danzig, DI'stribntiolls ill Liquidations ami
Reorgallizations-Their Tas COllsequences, 26 TAXES 645 (1948).
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Whatever may be the desirability of ta.~ing all earnings and profits
distributed in cancellation or redemption of stock, to read such a standard
into section 115 (g) would involve a gross misapplication of the Bedford
case as well as a warping of sections 115(c) and 115(g). Section 115(c),
it will be remembered, specifically allows the "gain" in partial liquidation
to be taxed as a capital gain. Section 115(g) was meant to remove cer-
tain transactions from the protection of section 115(c). But by referring
to the taxation of gains, section 115(c) contemplated the ta.~ation of
some earnings and profits as a capital gain. If section 115 (g) is in-
terpreted to tax every distribution of earnings and profits as "essentially
equivalent" to a dividend, then section 115(g), instead of qualifying
section 115 (c), would completely nullify it as far as partial liquidations
are concerned. And the Bedford case made no effort to reach this im-
proper result. It was confined strictly to section 112(c) (2). The Second
Circuit assumed that sections 112(c) (2) and 115(g) posed identical
problems because of their similar wording. In the interpretation of sec-
tion 112 (c) (2), however, the Supreme Court was not faced with a pro-
vision like section 115 (c) which contemplated the ta.~ation 0 f some
accumulated earnings as capital gains. It was, therefore, quite easy for
the Court in the Bedford case to apply the standard of section 115(a)
and conclude that section 112(c) (2) meant to ta.~ as a dividend all dis-
tributions of earnings and profits. Because of section 115 (c), it would
be impossible to interpret section 115 (g) in a similar manner. Cases
since Kirschenbaum have tacitly rejected the suggestion that section
115 (g) taxes all earnings and profits.142
Thus, an interpretation of section 115 (g) which is consistent with
section 115 (c) must settle for something less than the ta."ation of every
distribution of accumulated earnings and profits. But where shall the
line be drawn? If the present criteria ask the wrong questions and lead
to wrong answers, what can be substituted in their place? The main
suggestion here offered is that the courts actually study the "net effect"
of a distribution to see whether it resembles the type of distribution which
has been customarily taxed as a dividend under section 115(a). Many
courts in the past have espoused the "net effect" doctrine. Few have
actually applied it. Most courts have become bogged down along the way
by talking of valid business purpose, legitimate shrinkages, past dividend
142 Fred B. Snite, 10 T.C. 523 (1948), aii'd, 177 F.2d 819 (C.C.A.7th 1949); Joseph
W. Imler, U T.e. 836 (1948); L. M. Lockhart, 8 T.C. 436 (1947).
It might be contended that section U5(c) was meant to apply only to p:lrtialliquidations
of corporations having no earnings or profits. Under this interpretation the onl.1o' purpose
of section U5(c) would be to permit such partial liquidations to be treated as "sales or
e."changes" and thus get the benefit of section 117(b). But there is nothing in the
legislative history of section 115(c) to support this contention.
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records, and stockholder instigation. We submit that these criteria are
irrelevant to the main issue-whether the distribution has the net effect
of a dividend.
Dividends are distributions of earnings and profits to the stockholders
which do not change their proportionate interests in the corporation. liS
Any distribution in cancellation or redemption of some of the corpora-
tion's stock which meets this test should be taxed under section 115(g).
The suggestion at once is open to the attack that it cuts too deeply into
the policy reasons underlying the capital gains treatment for partial
liquidations. It may be argued that a blanket rule taxing all pro rata
redemptions will strike with one blow at earnings and profits which have
been accumulated over a long period, the precise situation which section
115 (c) was designed to avoid. Admittedly, a broad interpretation of sec-
tion 115(g) must leave less room for section 115(c). But Congress made
this inevitable when it enacted section 115 (g) with its "essentially equiva-
lent to a dividend" standard. The most obvious earmark of a dividend
is the pro rata distribution of earnings and profits. To except pro rata
distributions of earnings from taxation under section 115 (g) because of
an economically unsound concept like "legitimate shrinkage," or any
other business purpose test, is to make a mockery of the language of
section 115 (g).
It must also mean distributions of earnings, whether or not pro rata,
which do not substantially affect a stockholder's proportionate interest in
the corporation. In closely-held corporations, courts should look to see
whether those receiving the distribution have essentially the same interest
in the corporation as before the redemption. Family corporations should
be carefully scrutinized to determine whether there has been any real shift
in economic interest as a result of the cancellation or redemption. Thus
even a shareholder who transfers all his shares to a corporation, should
not escape section 115 (g) if the rest of the shares are held by his wife
or minor child, or by an estate, or another corporation in which his is
the sole beneficial interest. And of course a superficially non-pro rata
distribution should be subjected to section 115 (g) if there is a plan to
redeem shares of others at a later date so as to restore the status quo ante.
These criteria are essentially ones of exclusion. Transactions which
are encompassed by them should be taxed because they carry the char~
acteristics of a dividend even though cloaked in the formality of partial
liquidations. There is, however, one characteristic peculiar to redemptions
and cancellations which has a "net effect" not seen in usual dividends.
I f the distribution results in a genuine change in the ownership interests
of those receiving the dividend, it should escape taxation under section
143 Pullman, Inc., 8 T.e. 292 (1947).
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115 (g) and should be taxed to the e.xtent of the gain under section
115(c). Treasury regulations already e.xempt from section 11S(g) a
distribution made to a stockholder who is relinquishing all interest in
the corporation.144 But short of this e.xtreme are many instances where
a stockholder gives up an interest in the corporation in e.xchange for a
distribution of property which may be out of earnings and profits. Courts
have very rarely used this test as a basis for refusing to apply section
115(g)/45 although the converse, an unchanged position of ownership,
has frequently been given as a reason for imposing the section 11SCg)
tax.146 Undoubtedly, the fact that a stockholder was effectively parting
with a portion of ownership was a factor which led many courts to con-
clude that a "sale" and not a "partial liquidation" had occurred.uT It
was difficult for courts to tax in full the gain realized when a single
shareholder transferred a few shares to tlle corporation, especially if the
shareholder did not occupy a dominant position in the corporation. But
there is no reason for courts to resort to the "sale" label in order to
achieve this result. Section l1S(g) should not impose a ta-x on tllat type
of transaction. There is no doubt that a test of unchanged proportionate
interest would be a difficult one to draw. A dominant stockholder who
transfers a small portion of his holding to the corporation, even for sale
to outsiders, might still be held to have received a dividend under section
115(g) because there was no substantial change in his interest in the cor-
poration. But if the same shareholder parts with a sizable block of stock,
he should probably be adjudged beyond the scope of section 115 (g).
When the corporation has several classes of stockholders, other difficult
problems might arise. If, for instance, there is a conflict of interests
between the common and preferred, common might vote to redeem 100
per cent of preferred. The Commissioner might argue that since there
had been no change in proportionate interest among the preferred, and
since the redemption had been pro rata among the preferred, a ta-x under
section 115 (g) should be imposed. But it would appear that the completc
elimination of an interest of one complete class of stockholders, unlike a
dividend, represents a sufficient change of interest to warrant a tax undcr
section 115(c) rather than section 115(g).
While the suggested criteria may pose difficult problems of subsequent
interpretation, this consequence is unavoidable in the interpretation of a
144 Reg. 111, Sec. 29.115-9.
145 Fred B. Snite, 10 T.C. 523 (1948), a/I'd, 177 F.2d 819 (Cc.A.7th 1949).
146 Hirsch v. Comm'r, 124 F.2d 24 (C.C.A.9th 1941); Smith v. United States, 121
F.2d 692 (CCA.3d 1941).
147 Trust Co. of Georgia v. United States, 60 F. Supp. 470 (CL O. 1945); Harter
Bank & Trust Co. v. Gentsch, 60 F. Supp. 400 (N. D. Ohio 1945); Estate of James C.
Andrews, B.T.A. Memo. Dkt. 91029. P-H 11"39,365 (1939).
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section like 115(g). No pat formula can be devised. The most that can
be hoped for is a set of standards which will lead the courts in the right
direction. In interpreting section 115 (g), courts have too often used
criteria which have led them into areas having little relationship to the
problem which section 115 (g) must solve. The criteria presented here
demand a factual comparison of the distribution in question with distribu-
tions which are dividends under section 115 (a). Only this type of com-
parison can give to section 115 (g) the meaning which the language plainly
intends.
The Purchaser for Value. Courts have occasionally expressed mis-
givings about applying section 115 (g) to a person other than the original
recipient of the stock,14S It is felt that a purchaser of the shares for value
will be denied a return on his investment if, under redemption of some
of his shares, the distribution is taxed as a dividend under section 115(g).
Thus, in Parker v. United States,149 the Seventh Circuit reached the
admittedly "paradoxical" conclusion that "the redemption is a dividend
against the original recipient of the stock and not a dividend as against
the holder who acquired it for full value from the original recipient."
While the Parker case represents the only clear holding according special
protection to purchasers from the original recipients, the Parker philosophy
has been echoed elsewhere 150 and may be an unmentioned factor causing
courts to hesitate in the application of section 115 (g) .
Yet the purchaser for value receives no special treatment under section
115 (a) . Since section 115(g), in theory at least, taxes only those dis-
tributions which are essentially equivalent to a dividend, there is no
reason to feel any more sympathy for the purchaser who is taxed under
section 115 (g) than is felt for the same purchaser when he is taxed under
section 115(a). This is not to say that the Court in the Parker case was
wrong in refusing to apply section 115 (g) . There the dominant stock-
holder was planning a systematic liquidation of all the preferred stock
While the redemption of preferred was pro rata, there was so great a
shift of economic interest that a tax under section 115 (g) was entirely
unjustified. The court should have stated simply that section 115 (g)
did not apply because the distribution did not have the attributes of a
dividend. The fact that the petitioner was a purchaser for value should
have had nothing to do with this determination. The distribution was a
dividend in regard to neither the original recipients nor the purchasers
for value. It would be compounding error to extend the Parker philosophy
14S Flanagan v. Helvering, 116 F2d 937 (App. D. C. 1940); Comm'r v. Cordinglcy,
78 F.2d 118 (C.C.A.lst 1935) ; Comm'r v. Snite, 117 F.2d 819, 823 (C.C.A.7th 1949).
149 88 F.2d 907 (C.C.A.7th 1937).
150 See cases cited note 148 supra.
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and deny the application of section 115(g) to a purchaser for value if all
the other factors of the situation would justify a teL...:. There is no reason
to create a special category of stockholders. If the distribution is equiva-
lent to a dividend, by definition he will not have received a return of his
investment, because returns of investment are not ta....:able as dividends
under section 115 (a). The taA-payer will feel the weight of section 115(g)
only if the so-called return of capital is nothing more than a disguised
dividend.
The Intermediate Sttbsidiory-Tlze Problem of Com11l;ssiollcr v. 11'0110-
maker. One particularly pressing problem of legislative amendment re-
mains. A recent Tax Court opinion,1G1 affirmed pcr curiam last November
by the Third Circuit,m has opened an avenue of ta....: avoidance by re-
demption which can be closed only by an amendment to section 115(g).
The Wanomaker case arose out of a divorce settlement of $6,000 a month
which Rodman Wanamaker had made with his wife. Payments were
made by trustees of a voting trust which owned all the stock of the John
\iVanamaker Company of Philadelphia. \Vanamaker of Philadelphia, in
turn, owned all the stock of two New York subsidiaries which had earned
substantial profits. The trustees wanted to remove cash either from the
parent or the subsidiaries without paying a ta....: on ordinary dividends.
To achieve this result the New York subsidiaries bought some of the
stock of their parent held by the trustees. The trustees treated the trans-
action as a sale and deducted a capital loss. The Commissioner tried to
tax as a section 115 (g) dividend the distribution from the subsidiaries
to the stockholders of the parent. But neither the Ta....: Court nor the
Third Circuit could bring this transaction under section 115(g). Sec-
tion 115(g) applies only if a corporation "cancels or redeems its stock."
(italics added). There can be little doubt that "its stock" means "its own
stock" and not the stock of its parent. Once again, a loophole has been
found in a section that was designed to eliminate all loopholes created
by partial liquidations.
The implications of the Wanomoker decision are obvious and frighten-
ing. After years of tortuous judicial interpretation, it appears that a
stockholder, by the simple device of a wholly-owned subsidiary, can re-
move earnings out of the subsidiary through the subsidiary's purchase
of the parent's stock.1G3
And there is no reason why the device is limited to the parent-subsidiary
relationship. If two corporations are controlled by the same people, eam-
151 John Wanamaker, 11 T.C. 365 (1948).
152 Comm'r v. Wanamaker, 49-2 U.S.T.C. U9486 (C.C.A.3d Nov. 29, 1949).
153 Comment, Stocklwlder Reali::ation of Corporate Eamil/gs al/d tile I"collle Ta:r,
17 U. OF Cm. L. REv. 338, 344 (1950).
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ings can be removed from both corporations by having each corporation
purchase the other's stock. Under the interpretation of section 115 (g)
which the Wa11amaker case was forced to make, there would be no tax
barrier to this method for avoiding a tax on ordinary dividends.
Lest the Wallamaker case be used as a precedent to make a shambles out
of section 115 (g), Congress should amend the section to read as follows:
If a corporation reacquires its stock or the stock of another corporation at
such time and in such manner as to make the distribution and reacquisition
in whole or in part essentially equivalent to the distribution of a taxable divi-
dend, the amount so distributed as a result of the reacquisition of the stock,
to the extent that it represents a distribution of earnings or profits accumulated
after February 29, 1913, shall be treated as a taxable dividend.
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